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INTRODUCTION
The push for alternative energy resources in America has caused a
phenomenon in American jurisprudence: the dichotomizing of legal
approaches to interpreting mineral law. Analysis of the small collection of
landmark coalbed methane gas (CBM) ownership cases reveals a chaotic
trend in the interpretation of mineral law as a movement from traditional
judicial reverence for property rights toward a growing preference for
contract theory. Problematically, this trend is redefining mineral law in a
manner foreign to traditional interpretations of mineral theory and in
contravention to historical practices of mineral conveyancing. Much of
the problem lies in courts' collective resistance to addressing specific
extraction issues of a new group of split estate mineral owners who now
share mutual simultaneous rights to CBM. As a result, coalbed methane
case law resembles the practice of ad hoc interventions in equity, wholly
lacking in consistent principles of mineral theory. Moreover, the property
rights of split estate surface owners have suffered from the chaos, as
functional solutions to diminished rights of quiet enjoyment and
environmental protection have not been forthcoming.
This article is an effort to scrutinize the coalbed methane
phenomenon and its effect on a new class of split estate surface owners.
Analysis will include my assessment of historical conflicts between
111
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contract theory and property law which have come to disturb the
continuity of modem mineral law. As a centerpiece to understanding
these historical conflicts, I explore the issue of equitable intervention on
the part of the courts in mineral production issues. In concluding my
analysis, I illustrate why alternative dispute resolution is the single best
alternative to the pandemic of legal uncertainty in mineral law as it trends
away from property rights protections.
In accomplishing these goals, Part I of this article addresses the
physical properties of CBM and describes its new mineral value. Part II
analyzes the chaos behind CBM case law as it involves the Virginia
Supreme Court Case Harrison-Wyatt, LLC v. Donald Ratliff et al.' Part
III considers the "interface" 2 issues between contract theory and property
law, which disturb the continuity and predictability of mineral law. Part
IV retraces the historical conflict between contract theory and property
law. Part V looks at the big picture in coalbed methane production as it
affects the nation. Part VI reviews the nature of equitable intervention on
the part of recent courts in the treatment of split estate issues. Part VII
explains why there exists the equity illusion of just intervention in CBM
ownership cases. Part VIII suggests the best practice in managing CBM
issues is a focus on extraction rights. Part IX advocates for the use of
alternative dispute resolution to mitigate the chaos of CBM extraction
issues.
I. COALBED METHANE GAS AND ITS NEW MINERAL VALUE
Coal has been, and still is, the centerpiece in America's natural
resource recovery efforts. A shift in coal production trends is underway
however, and with it, a shift in the jurisprudential valuation of alternative
mineral resources. The result is a comprehensive national effort to exploit
indigenous fuel resources, which involves an expansive mining effort
westward. For example, "[i]n 1994, Appalachia produced 467 million
short tons of coal, and the western states produced 408 million short
' 593 S.E.2d 234 (Va. 2004).
2 See generally Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface,
101 COLUM. L. REv. 773 (2001) (Part III will analyze "interface" issues in detail).
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tons."3 "By the year 2000, Appalachia was producing 420 million short
tons, while the West produced 567 million short tons."4 Clearly, "[t]he
last decade has seen a steadily increasing share of coal production shift
from Appalachia and the mid-western states to the west." This shift has
brought a changing dynamic in the production of alternative fuels,
particularly in the extraction of coalbed methane gas (CBM).
A. Coalbed Methane Gas Production
Coalbed methane is a natural gas created as peat turns into coal. In
her research on the history of mining and coalbed methane gas production,
Elizabeth McClanahan explains how CBM is formed.
Utilizing GRI research, producers have learned that the
coalbed methane was not "stored" in the coalbeds in the
same manner as a conventional gas reservoir. Methane is
adsorbed onto the internal surface of the coal and held
there by the water pressure in the formation. In order to
remove the coalbed methane, the water pressure must be
reduced. Once the pressure is reduced, the coalbed
methane desorbs and flows to the wellbore through the
fractures in the coal.
The process of adsorption discriminates coalbed methane from
other gases, such as natural gas, which tends to be freer flowing.
Uniquely, "CBM has a tendency to remain adsorbed to the surface of
coal."7 It is released "only when the coalbed is depressurized by faulting
3 Ric Richardson, Governing Western Mineral Resources: The Emergence of
Collaboration, 43 NAT. RESOURCES J. 561, 564 (2003).
4d
6 Elizabeth A. McClanahan, Coalbed Methane: Myths, Facts, and Legends oflts History
and the legislataive and Regulatory Climate into the 21s' Century, 48 OKLA. L. REv. 471,
476 (1995) (emphasis added).
7 Katina L. Francis, Note, Mining Law -- Ownership of Coalbed Methane - A Judicial
Step Toward Efficient CBMand Coal Development. Southern Ute Tribe v. Amoco
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or drilling."8 "This characteristic complicates classification of CBM since
it is inevitably interrelated to the coal in which it is found." 9 Now that
CBM is a fuel in itself and not merely a bi-product, commercial mining
practices have grown at rapid pace to include CBM extraction.
Commercial mining for CBM began in the United States in the
1980s. Production of CBM has increased dramatically over the last two
decades, from several dozen wells in the 1980s to over 14,000 by the end
of the century." Clearly, natural gas is playing an increasingly important
role in America's energy policy, as natural gas currently provides 24% of
the country's energy needs and 16% of its electricity generation.12 In the
Appalachian Basin of Virginia alone production increased more than
300% from 1992 to 199313 to account for approximately 3% of total
production. 14 CBM extraction continued to rise, and in 1995 exceeded the
production of conventional gas in Virginia at almost twice the production
rate.' 5
In his work on the coalbed methane conflict in the American west,
Robert Duffy describes the production of CBM as an attractive alternative
to other natural gases.
In addition to its relative abundance, coal bed methane is
attractive from an economic perspective. Coal bed seams
are often much closer to the surface than conventional
natural gas fields, so methane wells are much cheaper to
drill and operate. In fact, the typical CBM well is
approximately six times cheaper to drill. Overall,
according to industry analysts the cost of finding and
Production Company, 119 F.3d 816 (10th Cir. 1997), 33 LAND & WATER L. REv. 469,
472 (1998).
Id. at 472-73.
9 Id. at 473.
10Id
" Robert J. Duffy, Political Mobilization, Venue Change, and the Coal Bed Methane
Conflict in Montana and Wyoming, 45 NAT. RESOURCES J. 409, 413 (2005).
12 Michael W. Brown, Coalbed Methane in Utah: Designing a Successful Approach, 26
J. LAND RESOURCES & ENvTL. L. 357, 360 (2006).
13 McClanahan, supra note 6, at 474.
14 Id. at 561 n.24.
" Id. at 561 n.25.
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developing coal bed methane averages about one-third the
cost of traditional deep-well natural gas.16
CBM is historically a waste product. However, today it is the most
rapidly growing source of alternative energy in the United States.
According to L. Lyman's research on CBM, "the United States Geological
Survey estimates that there are 700 trillion cubic feet of CBM trapped in
coal deposits in the United States, of which up to 100 trillion cubic feet--
worth nearly $1 trillion--are recoverable." 7 "Rather than being captured
and utilized, however, much of the recoverable CBM is released into the
atmosphere as coal mine methane ("CMM"), a byproduct of coal
mining."18  "At current prices, this wasted methane is worth over $1.5
billion per year."' 9
Much of the reason for ventilation of CBM, rather than its capture,
is the nature of complex legal and practical issues surrounding ownership
and extraction rights and responsibilities faced by split estate surface
owners and their subterranean counterparts, mineral owners and lessees.
"Extraction of minerals from different strata underlying a single tract [of
land] has long been a source of conflict between the oil and gas industry
and the coal industry." 20 Litigation of these issues has been slow and
piecemeal. Conversely, state and federal statutory law has ballooned with
complex standards for extraction, production and regulation of mineral
estates. Unfortunately, neither judicial nor legislative efforts have eased
the tensions between split estate relationships, improved environmental
protection or prompted balanced use of split estate lands. Recently, the
Virginia Supreme Court added to the complexity surrounding CBM
16 Duffy, supra note 11, at 413.
1 L. James Lyman, Comment, Coalbed Methane: Crafting a Right to Sellfrom an
Obligation to Vent, 78 U. COLO. L. REv. 613, 613-14 (2007); see also U.S. Geological
Survey, Coalbed Methane - An Untapped Energy Resource and an Environmental
Concern (Jan. 17, 1997), http://energy.usgs.gov/factsheets/Coalbed/coalmeth.html
(showing data used by Lyman).
* Lyman, supra note 17, at 614.
'
9 Id. at 614.
20 Jeff L. Lewin, Coalbed Methane: Recent Court Decisions Leave Ownership "Up in
the Air" But New Federal and State legislation Should Facilitate Production, 96 W. VA.
L. REv. 631, 674 (1994).
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production. Its decision in Harrison-Wyatt, LLC v. Donald Ratiff et al.
(Harrison- Wyatt)2' radically transformed the nature of CBM ownership in
the Appalachian Basin of Virginia.
B. Virginia's Treatment of Coalbed Methane under the Law
"In order to economically produce coalbed methane an artificial
stimulation of the coalbed or coal seam must occur., 22 In other words,
CBM will normally not escape in mass absent a method of fracturing the
coal seam. This fact is ironically problematic for Virginia owners of CBM
after the 2004 holding by the Virginia Supreme Court. In Harrison- Wyatt,
LLC v. Donald Ratliff et al., the Virginia Supreme Court held that title to
CBM does not pass to the coal owner but is retained by the fee surface
owner even if the only way to retrieve CBM is through mining activities.
This result renders Virginia's Harrison-Wyatt holding antithetical to the
historical practices of coal conveyancing in the Appalachian Basin and
impractical in its effect on CBM extraction. Problematically, the necessity
of coal fracturing impedes newly claimed surface ownership rights to
CBM, causing old mining practices and new ownership rights to collide.
Much of the problem with Virginia's new law lies in what the state
Supreme Court did not decide. The Court did not resolve the question of
what rights or liabilities surface owners have in retrieving CBM or what
rights coal extractors have in ventilating and/or capturing hazardous gas
from coal seams. In other words, the Virginia Court imposed a narrow
decision on the issue of ownership, leaving questions regarding extraction
rights unaddressed. Therefore, Virginia law stops short of a determinative
answer on how surface owners can lawfully extract CBM from coal seams
they do not own, and further, how coal owners can ventilate the CBM they
do not own, but must manage.
Virginia Law Stops Short of Extraction Issues
Significantly, most severance deeds in the Appalachian Basin date
back to the early to mid 1800s and have no language addressing the
ownership of CBM in conveyance language. Trade custom and operation
of law, however, have historically mandated coal mining operations to
21 593 S.E.2d 234 (Va. 2004).
22 McClanahan, supra note 6, at 476.
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vent CBM from mining sites so to reduce health and safety hazards caused
by CBM. Both of these conditions, taken together, industry practice and
deed language, have created an historic inference that liability for coalbed
methane and its extraction is integral to coal ownership and production. In
the Virginia Supreme Court's analysis in Harrison- Wyatt, the Court had to
consider exactly how to qualify ownership of a substance which has been,
until the early 1980s, a waste product 23 and effectively excluded from
virtually all conveyance language in the region, as general practice.
In Harrison-Wyatt, the Virginia Supreme Court took up the issue
of whether ownership of CBM remains with the surface owner, even after
he conveys interests in the coal to other parties. Three severance deeds
from the late 1800s were put into question. Language in the deeds
conveyed "all the coal in, upon, and underlying" mineral tracts 18, 19, and
56 in Buchanan County. In this case, the Virginia Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court's decision in its entirety to hold that "title to the
CBM [does] not pass to the coal owner." 24 The holding instantly re-
qualified virtually all legal relationships in the ownership, extraction and
production of subterranean coal minerals in Virginia's Appalachian Basin
region. The Court added conflict to the confusion by limiting its holding
to the issue of ownership of CBM without addressing lower court
limitations on surface owners' extraction rights to CBM.
In Harrison-Wyatt, the trial court limited surface ownership by
holding that surface owners' rights to CBM extend only to gas which has
already escaped or separated from the coal. The lower court added further
restriction by deciding that "[a] surface owner does not have the right to
fracture the coal in order to retrieve the CBM." 25 Essentially, the lower
court instituted an ownership-in- place rule for CBM, restricting extraction
rights without limitation. In other words, even if the surface owner has
title to CBM, the surface owner does not have the right to fracture coal
seams conveyed to other owners in order to retrieve methane gas.
The Virginia Supreme Court declined to address production
limitations placed on surface owners by the lower court, finding the issue
of extraction non-responsive to the legal question before it. In its holding,
23 Harrison-Wyatt LLC v. Ratiliff, 593 S.E.2d 234, 235 (Va. 2004).24 Ic. at 238.
25 Id. at 238 n.3.
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the Virginia Supreme Court expressed "no opinion" 26 regarding CBM
extraction. Consequently, Virginia's refusal to address the ownership-in-
place ruling creates a virtual nullity in meaningful efforts to establish fee
ownership in CBM. The result suggests that surface ownership of CBM
was either narrowly diagnosed by the Court or severely limited as a matter
of law. Unfortunately, the state Supreme Court's failure to qualify the
question of extraction leaves a host of production issues unaddressed.
Further, as will be seen, its decision has implications for the way in which
future courts may construct ownership arguments for extraction of
valuable minerals in a manner which strips settled authority from property
law.
To a large degree, the Court's decision in Harrison- Wyatt may
well represent a new legal approach to managing mineral estates through
greater emphasis on contract theory rather than on settled property law. In
a broad swing of the legal pendulum, the Virginia Supreme Court's
analysis of specific mineral case law illustrates a progressive
jurisprudential shift toward contract-based arguments for ownership of
CBM. Not surprisingly, Virginia's dramatic shift in its interpretation of
mineral law is part of a larger general trend in legal jurisprudence toward
contractualizing property ownership issues. Arguably, Virginia's analysis
of relevant case law in Harrison- Wyatt was a doctrinal effort to re-caste
earlier cases based on property rights into issues of contract theory. As a
result, elements of contract theory, and not property law, decided the
landmark holding in favor of surface ownership of CBM in Virginia.
C. A Trend toward Preferring Contract Solutions to Property
Issues
A broad range of legal scholars have advocated for the ascendance
of contract theory into a variety of property issues such as landlord-tenant
law, real estate conveyancing, and leasing law, to note a few.2 7
Proponents of the "Contract Approach" 28 suggest that notions of fairness
26 d
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are best served by flexible contracts with bargaining expectations which
shift in response to society's changing needs. 2 It has been argued that
"[s]uch a move will jolt [property law] out of its comatose state and make
conveyancing law more responsive to the needs of a modem society and
more sensitive to the intentions and common sense bargaining
expectations of the parties."30 Intertwined with this sentiment is the view
that "land owners have limited foresight," 31 whereby restricting land use
into the future may frustrate their own land use preferences for the
future.3 2
A general trend toward property law reform has developed within
courts through the context of the Restatement (Third) of Property. 33 "At
present the Restatement appears to be the best vehicle for property law
reform by advocating a contract approach to the law of real estate
contracts and conveyancing."3 4 Evidence of this is the increased use of
Restatement propositions. For example, "[t]otal published citations to
Restatements by 1998 were up to 141,087."35 What real effect new
contract theory and the new Restatement of Property have on CBM case
law is still uncertain. Once parsed into detail, however, the chaos of
current CBM case law demonstrates a clear analytical "focus on the
differences between modem contract theory and ancient property law."3 6
With this in mind, Part II will address the jurisprudential chaos
behind CBM case law as it was analyzed in Virginia's Harrison- Wyatt
decision. This section will attempt to discern the split in legal authority
between camps of state courts, and investigate the circumstances under
which coal owners prevailed in CBM ownership issues, and when they did
not.
29 Id. at 406; see generally Stewart E. Sterk, Freedom from Freedom of Contract: The
Enduring Value ofServitude Restrictions, 70 IOWA L. REV. 615 (1985).
,o Id. at 405.
31 Sterk, supra note 29, at 617.
32
3 Madison, supra note 27, at 469.
34 d.
3 Id.
36 Id. at 470.
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II. CASE LAW CHAOS BEHIND VIRGINIA'S SURFACE OWNERSHIP
DECISION
A. Virginia Analyzed Relevant Case Law
The Virginia decision was made after the state Supreme Court
reviewed a legal split in authority over CBM ownership. In deciding
Harrison- Wyatt, the Virginia Supreme Court analyzed six cases, five of
which were decisions of other state Supreme Courts. The Virginia Court
relied on the United States Supreme Court decision Amoco Prod. Co. v.
Southern Ute Indian Tribe, (Amoco) 37 however, to define coal as the term
was used at the turn of the twentieth century.
1. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Southern Ute Indian Tribe
In Amoco (1999), the United States Supreme Court reversed a
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals en banc decision on the issue of CBM
ownership. The Tenth Circuit held that CBM had rightfully been reserved
to the Southern Ute Indian Tribe in 1938 when the U.S. government
returned to the Utes equitable title to coal underlying homestead lands
historically annexed from tribal territory. The en banc or full court
decision was reached through judicial interpretation of conveyance
language found in the 1909 and 1910 Coal Lands Acts. The Coal Lands
Acts initially reserved to the federal government the subsurface lands of
early homesteaders for the benefit of federal coal reserves.38 The Circuit
Court found ambiguity in the Acts' conveyance language, to be resolved
in favor of the Ute Tribe. The Tenth Circuit's statutory construction
analysis was subsequently rejected however, by the United States Supreme
Court whose decision turned instead on the "ordinary and popular sense"
of coal's 1909 mineral definition.
Although a host of experts in Amoco failed to agree on the physical
nature of coalbed methane's relationship to coal, the Supreme Court held
1 526 U.S. 865 (1999).
38 Stacy L. Leeds, Note, Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Production Company:
Judicial Construction of Coalbed methan Gas Ownership, 17 ENERGY L. J. 489, 492-93
(1996).
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that "reservation of 'coal' in [the 1909 and 1910 Coal Lands Acts] did not
encompass CBM gas, since the common conception of coal at the time ...
was limited to solid rock substance." 39  The Supreme Court held,
therefore, that CBM had not been reserved to the Ute Indian Tribe when
coal rights in homestead lands were returned to them by the U.S.
government in 1938. Therefore, even though the Ute tribe had rightfully
reacquired coal ownership in 1938, it did not own the CBM embedded
within the coal reserves in 1999.40
Prior to Amoco, the Department of Interior reviewed reservation
language in the Coal Lands Acts. In 1981, the U.S. Department of Interior
Solicitor General issued an opinion on the reservation language "in order
to expedite the development of [the CBM] energy source.",4 1 The
Solicitor General "conclude[ed] that the reservation of coal under the
[Coal Lands] Acts did not encompass CBM gas."42 The opinion had
profound effect on the Amoco decision and subsequently Virginia's
Harrison- Wyatt case. The Solicitor General later retracted his opinion 43 i
light of the Tenth Circuit's decision en banc in support of the Tribe's
position. 44  However, the withdrawal of his opinion, on the eve of
Amoco's argument, was too late to stem the tide of new legal analyses of
coalbed methane ownership.
With the Amoco decision, ownership disputes between coal patent
owners and mineral lessees under the Coal Lands Acts were eliminated,
resolved in favor of a host of new private lessees.4 5 By "eliminating
ownership disputes" 46 between coal patent holders, Amoco "greatly
increased" 47 CBM production efforts, particularly in the Powder River
Basin of Montana and Wyoming. 48 Even more, new legal arguments had
3 Amoco Prod Co., 526 U.S. at 870.
40 Leeds, supra note 38, at 496.
41 Amoco Prod Co., 526 U.S. at 872.
42 d
43 Id. at 872.
4 Id.
4s M. Kristeen Hand & Kyle R. Smith, Comment, The Deluge: Potential Solutions to
Emerging Conflicts Regarding On-Lease and Off-Lease Surface Damage Caused by Coal
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successfully opened the west to energy expansion. The Supreme Court's
Amoco decision was resoundingly divergent, however, from the first state
court case ever to consider the issue of CBM ownership, U.S. Steel Corp.
v. Hoge.49
2. United States Steel Corporation v. Hoge (1983)
The very first case to determine CBM ownership illustrates a very
broad insight into the functional state of mineral law and its jurisprudential
history in America. United States Steep Corp. v. Mary Jo Hoge (Hoge)
asserts legal arguments representative of mainstream practices and
standard constructions of mineral law over the course of a hundred years
of American coal mining.
In Hoge, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court quieted title to a coal
severance deed in favor of the appellant coal owner, United States Steel
Corporation. The Court examined ownership rights against the backdrop
of experimental hydro-fracturing of coal seams in the commercial
development of coalbed gas.50 At the time, state justices labeled CBM as
a mineral ferae naturae, or free moving mineral, and held that gas within
the coal seam "must necessarily belong to the owner of the coal, -" so
long as it remains within his property and subject to his exclusive
control." 52 The Court, however, qualified United States Steel's ownership
of CBM interests as "less than perpetual."53  Qualification not
withstanding, Hoge's holding secured CBM extraction rights for the coal
owner by denying them to surface owners, who themselves, wanted to
lease drilling rights to CBM reserves in the coal.
The Pennsylvania Court buttressed its decision by highlighting the
far greater value of coal over CBM.54 It determined that "the [energy]
value of the coalbed gas is only one percent of the b.t.u. value of the
coal."ss Justices credited United States Steel with expending costly
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drilling operations to extract CBM reserves from the coal seam in
question. In that light, the Court held that all means of drilling was
rightful extraction even hydro-fracturing, since the "damage to coal
inflicted by these processes is within [the company's] dominion to
inflict." 57 The result was a holding, which not only decided the question of
CBM ownership in Pennsylvania, but also determined the extent of the
coal owner's right to develop CBM from reserves within the coal seam. In
its conclusion, the Court noted that "it strains credulity to think that the
grantor intended to reserve the right to extract a valueless waste product
with the attendant potential responsibility for damages resulting from its
dangerous nature." 8
3. NCNB Texas Nat. Bank, N.A. v. West (1993)
Ten years after the Hoge decision, Alabama weighed in on the
CBM debate. In NCNB Texas Nat. Bank, N.A. v. Neva Watkins West
(West), the Alabama Supreme Court quieted title to a coal severance
deed which reserved to the grantor interests in "all gas." The court held in
favor of coal lessees' rights to recover in situ CBM held within the coal
seam until the gas migrated into other strata, at which time the holder of
the gas estate had the right to reduce CBM to possession. Alabama
concluded, "[t]he resolution of this issue answers the question, What is
necessary for a grantor to convey separate estates in coal and coalbed
methane gas?"60 "In making this determination of law, the Court must
consider ... the methods, rights, and obligations of mining and extraction;
and the ways parties have dealt with mineral rights." 61
In West, the Alabama Supreme Court tempered the Hoge's holding
by constraining a broad trial court decision which found that "as a matter
of law, a reservation of 'all gas' does not include coalbed methane." 62
Alabama limited the trial court's all or nothing decision by holding that
56id.
7 Id. at 1384.
s8 Id. at 1385.
s 631 So.2d 212 (Ala. 1993).
6 Id. at 213.
6 1 Id. at 217.
62 1d. at 222.
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ownership of coalbed methane rests on its location at the time it is reduced
to possession, or "captured." 63 The State Supreme Court noted that its
holding in West was not inconsistent with Hoge, except for the Court's
distinction between state ownership theories. The Court commented,
"[o]ne must bear in mind that it is not the gas that is owned in Alabama,
but the right to reduce the gas to possession, and the analysis of Hoge
must be applied with this distinction."6 Alabama acknowledged
however, that such distinction "does not affect the extent of extraction
rights."6 5 "The issue here is who has the right to recover coalbed methane
gas." 66
Accordingly, Alabama relied on reservation language in the deed
to determine extraction rights to CBM. In this case, the deed of
conveyance specifically reserved in the Grantor "all of the oil, gas,
petroleum and sulphur in, on and under . .. with full right of ingress and
egress . . . to explore, develop, operate . . . for the purpose of mining,
drilling and developing the said lands and holdings for the production of
oil, gas, petroleum and sulphur ... including the right to inject or return
gas ... including the right to drill input wells or shafts for those purposes .
.. 67 The Court summarized Alabama law construing mineral leases, and
explained that, absent clear reservation language in a deed of conveyance,
an express grant of "all coal necessarily implies the grant of coalbed
methane gas." 68
In its holding, the Alabama Supreme Court effectively protected
coal owners' rights to CBM. The Court affirmed that "appellant gas
owners have no interest in coalbed gas recovered from horizontal or
vertical wells drilled directly into coalbeds before coal is mined." 69 It
determined that "[m]ining rights are peculiar, and exist from necessity,
and the necessity must be recognized, and the rights of the mine and land
63 Id.
64d. at 224 n.13.
65 Id at 223 (quoting Jeff L. Lewin et al., Unlocking the Fire: A Proposal for Judicial or
Legislative Determination of the Ownership of Coalbed Methane, 94 W.VA. L. REv. 563,
619 (1992)).
66 id.
67 Id. at 216-17.6 1Id. at 221.
691d. at 229.
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owners adjusted and protected accordingly."7 o However, the Supreme
Court reversed in part to find that appellant gas owners do have the right
to "produce and own all of the coalbed methane gas that has been, or that
will be, produced from gob wells [(escaped gas)] on the [sic] Property."7'
Alabama's partial reversal did not go far enough for the Montana Supreme
Court.
4. Carbon County v. Union Reserve Coal Co. (1995)
In Carbon County v. Union Reserve Coal Co. Inc. (Carbon
County),72 the Montana Supreme Court reversed a decision "finding
methane gas part of the coal estate and included in the conveyance of coal
and coal rights by Carbon County [political subdivision] to Union
Reserve's predecessor-in-interest." 73 The lower court held that as a matter
of law CBM rights were inherent in the right to mine coal. However,
subsequent to the trial court's ruling, the state statutory definitions of coal
and oil and gas changed in a new provision to the Montana Code
(MCA). 74 "In 1993, the Montana Legislature deleted the definition of gas
from the state Code, and added that "gas means all natural gases . . .
including methane gas." Further, "coal" means a combustible
"575carbonaceous rock ... coal does not include: (a) methane gas ...
On appeal to the Montana Supreme Court, the issue in Carbon
County centered on the question "Is coal seam methane gas [still] a
constituent part of the coal estate?" 76 The Montana Supreme Court held
that it was not. The Montana Court aligned with the decision in Southern
Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Production Co. (D. Colo. 1995)77 which stated
that "common sense dictates that in 1909 and 1910, Congress intended
7 0 Id. at 228 (quoting Chartiers Block Coal Co. v. Mellon, 25 A. 597, 598 (Pa. 1893)).
n Id. at 229.
72 898 P.2d 680 (Mont. 1995).
7 Id. at 682.
741d. at 686.
7 Id. at 689.
76Id. at 686.
n 874 F. Supp. 1142 (D. Colo. 1995).
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'coal' to mean the solid rock substance. Montana's holding hinged on
newly revised definitions and the rules of common contract theory.
Using the "plain meaning" doctrine of contract law, The Montana
Court distinguished the holding in Hoge from the case on appeal by stating
that "the Court in Hoge did not attempt to determine the intent of the
parties by looking to the plain meaning of the grant." 7 9 Further, Montana
opined that Hoge "went beyond the plain meaning of the reservation and
determined that the parties could not have intended to reserve what was
considered . . . merely a waste product."80 The Court used the maxim
"expression unius est exclusion alterius" or "the expression of one thing is
the exclusion of another" to support its determination that "the express
grant of one specific mineral does not imply the grant of all other minerals
not referred to in the grant."8' With the Carbon County decision,
Montana departed from conventional mineral law. Wyoming followed
suit.
5. Newman v. RAG Wyoming Land Co. (2002)
In Mary Newman, et. al. v. RAG Wyoming Land Co., (Newman)82
The Supreme Court of Wyoming reversed the trial court's summary
judgment in favor of the coal operators' rights to CBM as part of the coal
estate. In reversing, Wyoming framed the issue to be resolved as a
question of "whether the parties to the deed in question intended the
coalbed methane to be conveyed along with the coal estate or reserved to
the grantor as part of the oil and gas estate." 83 The Wyoming Supreme
Court held that coalbed methane gas was reserved to the landowners and
was not intended to be part of the coal conveyance. In its decision, the
Court analyzed the intent of the parties as represented in the language of
the conveyance itself.
78 Union Reserve Coal Co. Inc., 898 P.2d, at 686 (1995).
79Id. at 684.80 id.
81 Id.
82 53 P.3d 540 (Wyo. 2002).
83 Id. at 544.
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The Court's curious goal was to "interpret" 84 the "unambiguous
language"85 of the deed in question. The Court held: "[i]n interpreting
unambiguous contracts involving mineral interests, we have consistently
looked to surrounding circumstances, facts showing the relations of the
parties, the subject matter of the contract, and the apparent purpose of
making the contract." 86 Further, "[d]iffering interpretations of contracts
alone do not constitute ambiguity requiring extrinsic evidence."87 In other
words, the Court saw plain meaning in the contract but incorporated an
interpretation scheme used in mineral law to support the plain meaning
with parol evidence.
The language of the conveyance read, "all coal and minerals
commingled with coal that may be mined or extracted in association
therewith or in conjunction with such coal operations."88 The Court noted
that "the coal operator argues it intended to acquire all minerals that were
commingled with the coal in order to eliminate the possibility of conflicts
between the development of those minerals and its mining operation."89
For the sake of clarity, Wyoming used the Webster's Dictionary to assess
the plain meaning of the word commingled, and other words such as
extracted, released, escaped and ventilated. As a result, the Court could
not conclude that CBM "as a mineral" may be "mined or extracted in
association therewith or in conjunction with such coal operations when it
can only be produced through wells as any other gas." 90 It concluded
instead that "[r]ather than following some rigid rule of law, we believe this
issue should be governed by the facts and circumstances surrounding the
execution of this warranty deed."" By using the dictionary method,
Wyoming's Supreme Court therefore found "explicit severance" 92 of





81 d. at 550.89 Id. at 549 (emphasis added).
"Id. at 545.
9 11d. at 549.
92 Id. at 550.
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Virginia Supreme Court would take issue with Wyoming's treatment of
ambiguous reservation language.
6. Energy Dev. Corp. v. Moss (2003)
In Energy Development Corp. v. Nancy Louise Moss et. al.
(Moss), 93 the West Virginia Supreme Court addressed the narrow question
of whether a standard oil and gas lease executed in 1986 conveyed to the
lessee the right to drill into the lessor's coal seams for CBM.94 The West
Virginia Supreme Court held that "absent any specific language on the
issue [of coalbed methane gas]," 95 a standard oil and gas lease does not
give the oil and gas lessee the right to drill into the lessor's coal seams in
order to produce CBM. 96 After reviewing the Pennsylvania and Alabama
decisions, West Virginia determined that the greatest common factor
among all related decisions was "a consideration for the intent of the
parties, with emphasis on the state of affairs at the time of the grant, lease,
or conveyance." 97 With this focus, the Moss Court affirmed the lower
court's finding of latent ambiguity in the lease language reading "all of the
oil and gas." A finding of ambiguity successfully discouraged contract
analysis and any potential application of the plain language doctrine.
Having found latent ambiguity, West Virginia deferred to the
"general uses of the gas business"98 to infer the intent of the contracting
parties. "If the leases included the right to develop coalbed methane, then
they would also carry an implied right ... to invade the coal seams . . ."99
"Generally, a court will not find an implied right to conduct a given
activity (not mentioned in the lease) unless that activity is clearly
demonstrated to have been a common practice in the area, at the time of
the lease's execution." 00 In accordance, West Virginia adhered to "a
perspective that reflects the longstanding dominance of the coal industry
9 591 S.E.2d 135 (W. Va. 2003).
94 Id. at 138.
" Id. at 143.
96 1d. at 146.
97 d
98 Id at 145.
'9 Id
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of this state,"o'0 as written in the West Virginia Code.102 In its summation
of the Code, the Court observed that "worthy of note is the way the statute
completely avoids and eschews any attempt at deciding ownership of
coalbed methane."' 03 The Court noted further that "the Legislature chose
a path that would resolve conflicts on a case-by-case basis, encourage
cooperation among potential claimants, and foster the safe production of
coalbed methane, while protecting the safety of miners and the economic
value of coal."
In short, the Court's circumvention of contract theory in Moss
salvaged coal producer's rights to CBM. It's reasoning, "a gas lessee ...
holding a conventional gas lease need only obtain the express right to
produce coalbed methane from the lessor, or other party deemed to have
ownership," 0 5 or "the parties may seek 'resolution of conflicting claims . .
. by voluntary agreement or a final judicial determination."' 0  Contract
theory, however, would be the focus of Virginia's subsequent Harrison-
Wyatt case, and the basis for addressing the CBM ownership issue in
question.
B. Virginia Assessed a Split in Legal Authority
While analysis in Harrison- Wyatt was all too brief and equally
perfunctory in nature, the Court did survey the small group of cases
driving CBM ownership issues thus far. Cases analyzed in Harrison-
Wyatt fall into two opposing camps, clearly illustrating that state courts
have decided CBM ownership questions in one of two ways, either in
favor of the coal owner or against the coal owner.
1. Circumstances in which Coal Owners have Prevailed
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Over thirty years of legal chaos have passed since United States
Steel Corp. v. Hoge,'0o the first case to decide the issue of CBM
ownership. Hoge was decided during the birth of coalbed methane
commercialization inside the Appalachian coalfields at a time when
technologies such as hydro-fracturing were relatively new, safety hazards
abounded, and extraction costs were extensive.10 8 Coal production was
viewed as much more valuable than coalbed methane at that timel 09 and
both safety and technology barriers in capturing CBM were believed to
"interfere with full development of the coal, [causing] considerable
additional costs to the coal operator.""10 In that light, the Hoge court
relied on settled mineral law dating as far back as 1889111 to decide the
question of CBM ownership.
Subsequent cases in Alabama and West Virginia, supra, reinforced
the Hoge decision, not on theories of ownership, which were different, but
on extraction rights to CBM and the laws of reservation of property. In
other words, differing ownership laws among the states failed to negate
the courts' collective rationale that coalbed methane gas is part of the coal
estate as it lies within the coal seam, as a matter of settled law. In these
cases, CBM, which lies within the coal seam, is rightfully extracted by the
coal owner as a convention of mining law.
In focusing on extraction rights, the courts of Pennsylvania,
Alabama, and West Virginia were reluctant to imply rights or
responsibilities to "ambiguous" contract language. The courts were
uncomfortable assessing conveyances outside the scope of property rights
preserved within the "bundle -of sticks" paradigm by rules of the
reservation of property. The Moss Court noted that "if leases included the
right to develop coalbed methane, then they would also carry an implied
right ... to invade the coal seams ... and stimulate them in a fashion that
could make it more difficult or dangerous to later produce the coal."l 2 in
West, the court noted that releasing CBM in mining operations was a
107 468 A.2d 1380 (Pa. 1983).
'sId. at 1383.
10 Id. at 1382-83.
0old. at 1387 (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
ni Id. (quoting Westmoreland & Cambria Natural Gas Co. v. DeWitt, 18 A. 724, 725
(1889)).
112 Energy Dev. Corp. v. Moss, 591 S.E.2d 135, 145 (W. Va. 2003).
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correlative right of the coal estate, and that "to construe away this right
would be to construe away the grant itself, which cannot be enjoyed
without it."ll 3 Much of the courts' reluctance to imply rights against the
coal producer came from a shared view that property rights are immutable
and supported by a history of mining convention.
2. Circumstances in which Coal Owners have not Prevailed
Courts of Montana, Wyoming, and subsequently, Virginia, were
unified in finding coalbed methane a constituent of gas and therefore not
part of the respective coal estates in question. Each holding was primarily
the result of examining the plain language of contract conveyances and/or
leases at issue. Montana and Wyoming courts reached decisions on CBM
gas with virtually no reliance on historical rules of construction or
conclusions as matters of law. Neither court commented on the
technological implications of the various means of extracting CBM from
coal, nor did they expound on state histories of mineral production or
mining law. These courts focused explicitly on the intent of parties to a
contract agreement, after having decidedly defined CBM as a separate
constituent gas from the coal which created it. Both Montana and
Wyoming decided CBM ownership based on the plain meaning of coal as
defined by standards used in the mineral industry of the intermountain
west.
During the time when western courts like Montana and Wyoming
were making initial determinations about the ownership of CBM, these
inter-mountain states were just beginning to manage the commercial
production of CBM as an entirely new natural resource. For much of the
west, CBM production occurs in complex federal/private split estate
environments within public regions of the country.114
Federal split estate lands in the west are regulated differently than
private split estate lands in the east. In the west, mineral production
occurs regularly on public lands where the federal government owns either
subterranean minerals, surface lands, or both by virtue of a history of
" NCNB Tex. Nat'1 Bank, N.A. v. West, 631 So.2d 212,228 (Ala. 1993).I14 Andrew C. Mergen, Surface Tension: The Problem ofFederal /Private Split Estate
Lands, 33 LAND & WATER L. REv. 419, 426 (1998).
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federal land grants which reserved ownership of valuable minerals to the
federal government." 5 This means that on most mineral bearing lands in
the west, land owners are only surface land owners on otherwise public
government lands. "Public lands" are defined as "any interest in land
owned by the United States and managed by the Bureau of Land
Management (BLM).""' "The BLM is required to manage the public
lands under principles of multiple use and sustained yield, in accordance
with federal land use plans"" 7  through "easements, permits, leases,
licenses, published rules, or other instruments ... the use, occupancy and
development of the public lands."" 8 Conversely, in the east, decisions to
sever land have generally always been made through personal choices of
private individuals, regulated primarily through state intervention via
statutory law or the courts.
Given the dichotomy of experience between split (severed) estates
in the east and those in the west, it is not surprising that two different
regions would decide differently on natural resource issues like coalbed
methane gas. What is surprising is Virginia's Harrison-Wyatt decision in
light of its regional and historical ties to mineral production and privately
severable estates.
Appalachian states have been pro-mineral development,
historically, for reasons of economy and regional development.
Appalachia's system of railroads and roadways are examples of the early
reliance states had on mineral production for vital development of the
economically depressed region of the Appalachian Basin.' Given the
severity of poverty and the geography of isolation,120 implications for true
dependency of the region's infrastructure on the productivity of local
mining industries are great. In addition to that dependency is the
desperate need for employment and alternative sources of income which
115 Id
"
6 Id. at 443.
117 Mergen, supra note 114, at 444.
"
8 Id. (quoting 43 U.S.C. section 1732 (b) (2000)).
"
9 Bryan C. Banks, High above the Environmental Decimation and Economic
Domination ofEastern Kentucky, King Coal Remains Firmly Seated on Its Gilded
Throne, 13 BuFF. ENvTL L.J. 125, 132 (2006).
120 Id. at 148 n.140.
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selling severable mineral rights could allay. With such rife dependency,
mineral production quickly overcame the region.
In the span of 50 years following the Civil War, the private land
owning populations of the Appalachian Basin states deeded away most of
their subterranean rights to mineral producers, often through
unconscionable instruments like broad form deeds.121 Frequently, "[t]hese
deeds left only a nominal title to the surface and total responsibility for
property taxes with the landowner." 22 "The assault was so successful that
by 1910, nearly 85 percent of the mineral rights had been relinquished by
the Appalachians and were under the control of outside interests." 23 "To
add insult to injury,"1 24 regional courts often held that such deeds
"conveyed the rights to excavate and remove all subsurface minerals and
permitted the subsurface owner to use the surface as necessary for either
removal or storage of those minerals."' 25 Appalachian surface owners
clearly suffered from early privatized mineral production, and in fact, still
suffer generations later.
With the Harrison- Wyatt decision, Virginia has become a unique
case within the Appalachian Basin in its shift away from traditional
analysis of mineral law. The distinguishing nature of Virginia's holding in
Harrison-Wyatt warrants a closer look at underlying legal decision-
making in the case of coalbed methane gas. Arguably, one of the most
important benefits of having a unified legal system, is the reliability on
predictable and consistent interpretation of the law. Predictability and
consistency are absent, however, in the unfolding of modem mineral law
as illustrated by the upheaval in CBM litigation, clearly illustrated in the
Court's analysis in Harrison- Wyatt.
3. The Case of Virginia
Potentially, when institutions reflect a mixture of in
personam and in rem rights, they will adopt legal rules that
.2. Id. at 132.
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reflect a kind of muddled blend of principles associated
with contract systems and property systems . . . in an
irregular fashion that corresponds to no clear pattern. 12 6
Coalbed Methane case law since Hoge has grown into an
incoherent "muddled blend" of legal principles. Subsequent courts have
commented on the forced reasoning in cases coming out of Ho e, noting
that courts have used "confusing and inconsistent reasoning,"l 2 in issues
"focused upon the bundle of property rights incident and necessary to the
recovery of coal." 2 8
Legal chaos is readily exemplified in the pivotal West Virginia
case of Energy Development Corp. v. Moss. 129 The West Virginia Court
struggled against issues of intent which dominated the ownership question
in Moss, as it has in virtually all other CBM ownership cases. Tangled
analysis in Moss clearly demonstrates the paradigmatic struggle between
core values of property law and contract theory prevalent in most issues
deciding modern mineral cases. Virginia's response to Moss is a good
example of the turmoil.
One year after Moss safe guarded protections for coal owners
against intruding gas lessees, Virginia's Supreme Court stripped CBM
ownership from coal estates with little or no comment on West Virginia's
decision. The Moss dissent caught Virginia's attention, however. Justice
Albright dissented in Moss, reproaching the majority for finding ambiguity
in plain language, avoiding deciding the meaning of gas, and construing
the leases involved in order to prevent the gas lessee from exploring for
gas by drilling into the coal seam. 130 Justice Albright concluded his
argument by summarizing the practical effect of West Virginia's decision.
The reality is that the majority's ruling is not a victory for
most small landowners in this state . . . Rather it is a huge
126 Merrill, supra note 2, at 779. The authors offered this possibility along with the
possibility that organizations which blend contract and property principles could also
potentially create a consistent pattern of behavior. Id.
27 Newman v. RAG Wyo. Land Co., 53 P.3d 540, 548 (Wyo. 2002).
128 Id. at 547.
129 Energy Dev. Corp. v. Moss, 591 S.E.2d 135, 145 (W. Va. 2003).
13o1d. at 153.
134
EQUITY ILLUSION OF SURFACE OWNERSHIP IN CBM OWNERSHIP
victory for the owners of large tracts of coal who hold that
coal by virtue of severance deeds made decades ago, long
before the economic potential of coalbed methane or, for
that matter, the economic potential of natural gas generally
had been recognized.131
Arguably, Albright's dissent in Moss became the basis for the
holding in Harrison-Wyatt. Albright opined that had gas lessees been able
to drill into coal seams and found CBM, they would have been required to
pay royalties to lessor surface owners, as a benefit of production. In
Harrison-Wyatt, the Virginia Supreme Court tacitly engaged Albright's
argument. It reasoned that plaintiff surface owners were, in fact, entitled
to royalties placed in escrow for the production of coalbed methane gas by
finding plain meaning in contract language and by defining coalbed
methane gas as a separate mineral entity from coal. In sum, Virginia's
recognition of surface ownership illustrates a contemporary preference for
contract theory in mineral conveyance cases.
With an understanding of courts' legal analyses of landmark CBM
cases, Part III will consider the "interface"' 32 issues between contract
theory and property law which have disturbed the continuity and
predictability of modem mineral law, particularly with respect to
categorizing CBM as a new natural resource. Part III will focus on the
issue of intent in contract theory and on those mineral theories which bind
property rights to mineral law. The benefits and hazards of relying on in
rem and, conversely, in personam theories in the context of mineral law
will be explored.
III. "INTERFACE" ISSUES DISTURB CONTINUITY & PREDICTABILITY IN
MINERAL LAW
Decisions notwithstanding, the primary effort of courts in their
deliberation of CBM ownership has been to reveal the original intent of
conveying parties. In Moss, the West Virginia Supreme Court noted that
"while [CBM] decisions do differ in many regards, the greatest common
135
1' Id. at 156.
132 See generally Merrill, supra note 2.
Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV., Vol. 16, No. I
factor among these decisions is a consideration for the intent of the parties,
with emphasis on the state of affairs at the time of the grant, or
conveyance." 33
Prescribing intent to conveyance language however, has resulted in
the rivaling of contract theory against laws of property. The judiciary's
varied attempts to create significant precedent in CBM case law has
achieved only one clear result so far; courts have generated sufficient
confusion to blur clear legal analysis in the matter of intent and coalbed
methane ownership. In simple terms, the dilemma has resulted in a legal
contretemps between contract theory and rules of property over how to
apply mineral law to CBM issues.
A. The Issue of "Intent"
The primary issue emerging from CBM ownership analysis is how
to interpret conveyance language which is silent on the reservation of
coalbed methane gas. Across the board, courts in which coal owners have
prevailed as concurrent owners of CBM have done so by virtue of the
strict interpretation of the rule of reservations of property rights, whereby
all reservations must be specifically termed. On the other hand, courts in
which coal owners have not prevailed have lost on the analysis that,
historically, original fee owners were not in the position at the time of
conveyance to appreciate the value of CBM and therefore did not convey
interest in it to coal owners. Courts like Montana, used the latin maxim
"expression unius est exclusion alterius," or the expression of one thing is
the exclusion of another, in order to hold that "express grant of one
specific mineral does not imply the grant of all other minerals not referred
to in the grant." 34
Rectifying competing conveyance rules under the law of minerals
is sometimes difficult. The conundrum lies in courts' disposition of
property rights via contract constructions that render clearly incongruent
outcomes. In his work on contract construction, Keith Rowley
summarizes the rule for valid reservation of rights under property law:
.. Moss, 591 S.E.2d at 146.
134 Carbon County v. Union Reserve Co., Inc., 898 P.2d 680, 684 (Mont. 1995).
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A valid reservation in or exception to a conveyance
must contain words 'as definite as those required to convey
title.' Everything 'not unequivocally and specifically
reserved' is deemed to be 'conveyed by the granting clause.'
The reservation must 'describe the interest reserved with
certainty,' must be 'of some portion of the granted premises,
which without the reservation, would be conveyed by the
deed,' and must 'necessarily be of something which belongs
to the grantor at and before the execution of the deed." 3 5
Courts deciding CBM ownership issues have followed the rule for
reservation of property with differing results. Rowley suggests that
different approaches to interpreting ambiguity cause differences in the way
courts conclude deed reservation issues. For example, courts in which
coal owners have prevailed as concurrent CBM owners have found
ambiguity in the relevant conveyance language. Courts who find
ambiguity often use surrounding evidence to create a "practical
construction" 13 6 of the meaning of the conveyance, a common practice in
mineral cases. On the other hand, "[a] minority of courts adheres to a
more 'objectivist approach," 3 7 or four corners approach, in which the
contract itself is isolated for analysis without the use of extrinsic evidence.
As a matter of law, a court is free to deny "interpretational aides"' 3 8 after
finding that a conveyance is unambiguous on its face as a whole. In
effect, those courts in which coal owners did not prevail, did not find
ambiguity, and relied as a result on the plain language rule analysis to re-
script reservation language by defining-out CBM as a non-constituent of
coal.
In CBM cases, courts clearly imposed a variety of external
evidence onto deed agreements in order to decide ownership issues. As
described, some courts like Hoge, West and Moss regarded matters of
mineral convention and public policy with greater reverence, while others
135 Keith A. Rowley, Contract Construction and Interpretation: From the "Four
Corners" to Parol Evidence (and Everything in Between), 69 Miss. L.J. 73, 202 (1999).
1 Id at 148.
In Rowley, supra note 135, at 86 (quoting CHARLES L. KNAPP ET AL., PROBLEMS IN
CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 422-33 (4 th ed. 1999)).138 Id. at 86.
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such as Carbon County, Newman and Harrison-Wyatt gave fuller effect to
the contract language involved. In other words, courts deciding CBM case
law have managed the intricacies of intent rules in ways which ultimately
justified their own rulings, whatever those rulings may have been.
Unfortunately, the bevy of contorted arguments made as a result has
proved a disservice to understanding functional principles of mineral law
as they apply to CBM ownership.
B. Origins of Ties that Bind Property Rights to Mineral Law
Fortunately, there are a few clear principles of mineral law which
are not in question in CBM ownership issues. Together, these principals
of mineral law have combined historically to create an early predisposition
for using real property law to decide issues of ownership and extraction of
coalbed methane: (1) early development of real property ownership
theories; (2) the practice of mineral estate dominance; and (3) the
inherently migratory nature of coalbed methane gas. Doctrines arising out
of these aspects of mineral theory bind property rights to mineral law,
albeit with potentially negative results for surface owners.
1. Ownership Theories
In reality, conflicting state ownership theories have had little real
impact on how courts have decided CBM ownership issues. Courts have
differed in their analyses between ownership-in-place and non-ownership
theories and still emerged with oddly consistent decisions for CBM
ownership. This is a curious effect which deserves further attention.
Ronald Polston has traced the historical evolution of ownership
theories of property in a manner which clarifies the changing dynamics of
modem American property law. He illustrates how ownership theories
evolved through judicial efforts to develop mineral estates. Essentially,
"[t]he theory upon which mineral ownership is based was created to serve
the coal industry as it developed." 39 Polston's explanation of differing
ownership theories and their origins is instructive in this regard.
139 Ronald W. Polston, Mineral Ownership Theory: Doctrine in Disarray, 70 N. DAK. L.
REv. 541, 45 (1994).
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Property law historically divided ownership interests into the
residual estate, or fee estate, and thereafter any lesser interests, or several
rights, granted from the fee estate were granted as servitudes, one being
"access for a limited purpose." 40 Coal ownership was an anomaly for
early courts because it defied definition as an incorporeal servitude, or an
interest in land less than fee simple ownership.141 Any interest less than
fee simple could not be transferred by livery of seisin, or physically
delivered, and therefore was incorporeal or intangible, non-possessory.142
Courts, therefore, had to determine if underground coal seams
were possessory interests in land or were merely several rights to enter for
the limited purpose of removing coal. For some courts, a corporeal right
to remove coal from the land was contradictory, particularly because coal
ownership was unquantifiable.143 In other words, prior to opening a mine,
coal owners could not be sure if any coal even existed or to what
degree.144 The ownership-in-place theory emerged from this contradiction
in property law.145
Ownership-in-place theory enabled courts to uphold access to coal
removal by upholding interests to coal in-place.146 The courts constructed
a possessory interest in coal by conceiving of the coal interest as tracts of
land below the surface at a depth sufficient for surface owners to hold the
residual estate above.147 Ownership-in-place theory gave mineral owners
access to remove coal underground without owning the surface estate
overhead. As Polston explains, coal owners had a right "to only such coal
as may be present, and if there is none, or if it is mined out, the interest
ceases to confer a right of access to the land." 48  Subsequent courts
weakened these quasi-corporeal limitations by expanding a coal owner's
exclusive right to occupy open space, such as tunnels already mined out of
1 Id. at 544.
141 Id at 448.
142 Id. at 541-42.
143 Id. at 545-46.
'" Id at 545.
145 Id.
'"Id.
147 Id at 545.
148 Id at 549.
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the coal, until all coal had been mined.149 Polston notes that "with respect
to oil and gas, [the ownership-in-place] approach has been rendered
meaningless by the rule of capture, which holds that the ownership is lost
if those substances migrate across boundary lines." 5 0 This is precisely
the issue left unresolved in Harrison- Wyatt. Virginia's trial court
effectually prescribed ownership-in-place for surface owners of CBM in
Virginia. The Virginia Supreme Court imposed little more in the way of
functional rights when it held that surface owners had become owners of
CBM.
Not all courts adopted the corporeal ownership theory of mineral
estates. Some courts found it difficult to entitle mineral owners to more
than a right to access the land for mining purposes. In addition, some
early courts perceived that oil and gas flowed like underground rivers 5 1
unattached to any given surface estate, and therefore were not corporeal to
any estate until reduced to possession. 152 Courts analogized subterranean
minerals with animals ferrae naturae, or animals free in the wild, which
were not considered owned until hunters or the like reduced them to
possession. 15 This analogy reinforced the incorporeal, or non-possessory,
nature of mineral estates, and is often called the non-ownership theory. 54
The non-ownership theory provides that transmigratory minerals are not
the same as solid minerals and therefore the nature of ownership is
different.' 5 5  Therefore, "the ownership-in-place theory was required to
make an accommodation for that fact, and it did so by accepting the rule
of capture."' 5 6
Rule of capture provides estate owners the right to capture and
reduce to possession any or all transmigratory minerals obtainable,
without liability to adjoining landowners who consequently share the same
right.15 7  Some courts use the percolating waters analogy to the rule of
149 Id. at 549-50.
'so Id. at 547.
Id. at 551.
152 Id. at 550.
1s3 Id. at 551-52.
15 4 Id. at 551-52.
's Id. at 552-53.
16 Id. at 552.
'
7 Id. at 552.
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capture because of the settled nature of water law.'5 8 However, because
of the potentially harsh outcomes of the rule, correlative rights of
competing surface owners have since attached to the implied right to
capture.15 9  Under the correlative rights doctrine, proceeds from the
production of oil and gas are shared by overlying property owners based
on the idea that each could have produced according to the rule of
capture. 60
Polston opines that courts today have difficulty differentiating
ownership theories even to the extent that decisions are made "contrary to
the theory which the state purports to follow."'61 Further, "leading writers
in the field have concluded that the results in decided cases do not seem to
depend upon the theory which the state has adopted." 62 As described,
this is particularly true in coalbed methane cases.
Realistically, undermining ownership theories in mineral cases can
diminish the force of property law. Issues of mineral production are
unavoidably anchored to property rights. Courts that impose contract
theory onto corporeal rights of mineral ownership do so at the risk of
assaulting clear principles of mineral law. As can be seen, these rights
were created early in mineral production and are the glue holding
multiple-owner relationships together under the auspice of the mineral
estate dominance doctrine. Mineral estate dominance is a contrived
doctrine. It was born from the political fervor to maximize mineral
production during the era of early industrialization. For that reason,
mineral dominance is the primary precept in mineral law and virtually
iisurmountable.
2. Mineral Estate Dominance Doctrine
Mineral rights dominate the law of severed estates. Even
incorporeal theories of ownership acknowledge the dominance of mineral
1ss Jared C. Bennett, Ownership of Transmigratory Minerals, Utah and Zebras: Proof




161 Polston, supra note 139, at 553.
16 2 id.
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rights against severed surface estates. 163  Mineral estate dominance is
attributed to early ownership-in-place theories. Early ownership-in-place
theories meant that severed mineral interests were subject to the same
rights as other corporeal interests in Real Property.' Generally however,
subsurface owners have always enjoyed additional incidental rights to
enter upon the land of the surface owner during extraction of subsurface
minerals, to some degree as public policy.165
Discussion on the mineral estate dominance doctrine usually traces
its way back to early cases in Pennsylvania, and to the Supreme Court
case, Steel v. St. Louis Smelting and Ref Co. (Steel) 166 In Steel, the
United States Supreme Court upheld a mineral patent for mining in the
middle of the town of Leadville, Colorado. The Supreme Court held that
"land embraced within a town site on the public domain, when
unoccupied, is not exempt from location and sale for mining purposes." 67
"Whenever, therefore, mines are found in lands belonging to the United
States, whether within or without town sites, they may be claimed and
worked."l 68 Eastward, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court embellished the
public policy approach of mineral production by describing mineral
development as a public good. In Chartiers Block Coal v. Mellon,169 the
Pennsylvania Court held:
To place [coal, oil, gas, and iron] beyond the reach of the
public would be a great public wrong. Abounding, as our
state does, with these mineral treasures, so essential to our
common prosperity, the question we are considering
becomes of a quasi public character. It is not to be treated
as a mere contest between A and B over a little corner of
earth. 170
163 Bennett, supra note 158, at 351, 353.
'i Id. at 351.
165 Id. at 354.
'6 106 U.S. 447 (1882).
161 Id. at 450.
16s id.
169 Chartiers Block Coal Co. v. Mellon, 25 A. 597 (Pa. 1893).
70 Id. at 599.
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By virtue of public policy, tenets of mineral law have always
observed the general rule of mineral estate dominance.1 7 1 Attached to this
rule is the observance of incidental rights of mineral extractors to use
surface land to access and remove subterranean minerals.172 Over time,
and with industrial development of the mining industry, mineral estate
dominance and the incidental rights of mineral owners were curtailed by
the courts to a limited degree.' 7 3 The pick axe gave way to large machine
operations, multiplying the degree of surface and environmental damage
caused by poorly restrained mineral law.174 Today in fact, "the mineral
industry has the muscle to inflict damage to the surface to a degree
unfathomable to lawmakers in the nineteenth century." 75
Theoretically, two "limiting principles" 176 were eventually
constructed by courts in order to balance some power between mineral
extractors and surface owners. First, a reasonableness standard for
measuring excessive surface damage was imposed, 7 7 and later a strict
liability measure for failure to provide subjacent support was introduced
through the courts in order to mitigate surface damage.'7 8 Initially, courts
created a reasonableness standard against which miners were enjoined
from damaging surface lands once their mining activities were proved by
surface owners to be excessive.1 79 It was, and still is, the surface owner's
burden of proving unreasonableness, however.' 8 0
"7 Keith G. Bauerle, Reaping the Whirlwind: Federal Oil and Gas Development on
Private Lands in the Rocky Mountain West, 83 Denv. U.L. Rev. 1083, 1093 (2006)
(citing Kenney-Costal Oil Co. v. Kieffer, 277 US 488, 505 (1928)).
172 Id. at 1084 (citing Wyo. Outdoor Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 351 F.
Supp.2d 1232, 1245 (D. Wyo. 2005)).
173 M. Kristeen Hand & Kyle R. Smith, The Deluge: Potential Solutions to Emerging
Conflicts Regarding On-Lease and Off-Lease Surface Damage Caused by Coal Bed
Methane Production, 1 WYO. L. REv. 661, 672 (2001).
174 Bauerle, supra note 171, at 1084.
175 Hand, supra note 173, at 673.176 ichelle Andrea Wenzel, Comment, The Model Surface Use and Mineral
Developoment Accommodation Act: Easy Easements for Mining Interests, 42 AM. U.L.
REv. 607, 628 (1993).
17 Id. at 626-27.
"' Id. at 627-28.
71 Id. at 626.
io Id. at 630.
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Over time, the courts created an absolute right to subjacent support
for surface owners' land. 8 ' As a result, mineral producers must provide
"subterranean support for the land surface and for improvements existing
or reasonably anticipated to be constructed on the surface after mining
commences."l 82 In other words, the right of subjacent support incurs strict
liability on mineral owners who damage surface lands by failing to
support surface structures from under the ground. Legal protection is rare,
however, for surface owners who have waived their rights to subjacent
support. Virginia courts have been unforgiving of waiver language in
deed conveyances. In Ball v. Island Creek Coal Co., the court found
that plaintiffs predecessors in interest had effectively waived rights to
subjacent support because of deed language which permitted mining
"without leaving any support for the overlying strata."'l84
Better Protection Through Accommodation
Texas courts went a step beyond finding liability for failure to
provide subjacent support for surface lands. Through case law, the Texas
Supreme Court added weight to the reasonably necessary standard by
requiring mineral producers to use "alternative means of access to a
mineral site"18 5 when practicable. In Getty Oil Co. v. Jones186 the court
held that oil pumps which blocked a surface owner's irrigation system
amounted to unreasonable access because without the irrigation system the
surface owner's land would become agriculturally unsustainable, and
because there were alternative means of access to the oil under the land.
Surface owners are still burdened to prove that current mineral use
is unreasonable, however, in addition to showing that an alternative means
of access exists which is less damaging to surface land. "The
accommodation of the surface owner's interests does not envision a
balancing of surface owner harm or inconvenience against mineral owner
rights, but rather, the surface owner must prove that the mineral owner's
use of the surface is not reasonably necessary as shown by reasonably
Id. at 627.
182 Id. at 627.
18' 722 F. Supp. 1370 (W.D. Va. 1989).
8MId. at 1372 (citing Mullins v. Beatrice Pocahontas Co., 432 F.2d 314, 317 (1970)).
185 Mergen, supra note 114, at 435.
186 470 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. 1971).
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available alternatives."18 7 Unfortunately, only a handful of mining states
adhere to the Accommodation Doctrine.
On federal lands in the west, the Bureau of Land Management
(BLM) regulates public split estate lands under a doctrine somewhat
similar to the Accommodation Doctrine. 189 The BLM regulates mining
practices in accordance with a federal "unnecessary and undue
degradation" 190 standard. This standard defines unreasonable use as
"surface disturbance greater than what would normally result when an
activity is being accomplished by a prudent operator in usual, customary,
and proficient operations of similar character."'91 Some scholars argue
that the "unnecessary and undue degradation" standard "vests considerable
regulatory discretion in the BLM and that the agency has the authority to
prohibit mineral exploration and extraction where necessary to protect the
environmental values served by the surface estate."1 92 As will be seen, the
BLM has not always used its authority for that purpose.
3. The Migratory Nature of CBM
The migratory nature of CBM has necessitated a different kind of
ownership analysis from that of solid mineral deposits. Essentially,
mineral analysis segmented into separate bodies of law with the
emergence of oil and gas production. Oil and gas law fills a unique niche
in property theory because of the complexity of the ownership issues
generally involved. Oil and gas law is, in effect, property law's most
recalcitrant theory, as illustrated by the West case. Location is a key detail
in the mechanics of oil and gas law.
In West, the Alabama Supreme Court ordered the disposition of
CBM ownership interests depending on where the CBM was located at the
18 Drake D. Hill & P. Jaye Rippley, The Split Estate: Communication and Education
Versus Legislation, 4 WYo. L. REv. 585, 594 (2004).
1 See Mergen, supra note 114, at 433 (noting that the doctrine is followed in Utah,
Texas, Arkansas and New Mexico).
9 Id. at 444.
1901Id
' See id.; 43 C.F.R. § 3809.0-5(k) (1997).
192 Mergen, supra note 114, at 444-45, (quoting Marla E. Mansfield, On The Cusp of
Property Rights: Lessons from Public Land Law, 18 ECOLOGY L. Q. 43, 46 n.13 (1991)).
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time it was captured.193  The Court's analysis illustrates the physical
limitations of contract theory in negotiating positive rights between
specific parties to an in rem action. Theoretically, contract law simply
cannot negotiate where parties will find CBM. Gas is either in the seam
upon extraction or it is not. Therefore, there are natural limitations to the
freedom of contract in mineral law. Natural contract limitations illustrate
the need for an underlying scheme of in rem rights to define the scope of
contract actions used to negotiate mineral ownership.
To illustrate, there are three primary methods used to extract CBM:
horizontal boreholes, vertical degasification, and gob wells.194  All
methods require that coal seams are fractured. Further, all methods are
generally necessary to fully degasify mines during production.
Horizontal boreholes are holes drilled horizontally into the coal
seam "from a point within the coal mine itself." 9 5 Gas flows into the
borehole when released by drilling and can then be captured for
production.196 Vertical degasification, often improperly referred to as
hydro-fracturing, is a method of venting which drills vertical shafts from
the surface into underlying coal seams, releasing trapped gas to the
surface.197  Vertical degasification was originally intended for use in
extracting oil and natural gas from deep wells. Hydraulic fracturing is
often used in conjunction with vertical degasification as an "enhancement
technique"' 98 for extracting CBM for production purposes. Hydraulic
fracturing occurs when high intensity water is forced into vertical wells so
to break through, or fracture, underlying coal seams in a manner which
ruptures segments of the coal.199 "Hydraulic fracturing facilitates the
desorption of the methane from the coal's internal surfaces." 200  Upon
193 NCNB Texas Nat. Bank, N.A. v. West, 631 So.2d 212, 223 (Ala. 1993) (noting that




198 Marcus G. Puder, Did the Eleventh Circuit Crack "FRAC"? - Hydraulic Facturing
After the Court's Landmark LEAF Decision, 18 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 507, 510 (1991).
'9Id. at 510.
200 Id. at 514.
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fracturing, "[c]oalbed methane gas tends to flow in a sluggish trickle from
the seam to the well because it is so tightly attached to the cleats within
the crystalline structure of the coal."20'
Gob wells are the result of longwall mining practices.202 Seams of
coal are often mined using a large machine grinder which breaks up the
coal as it grinds forward into the coal wall.203 As the wall is pushed back,
open areas become unsupported and overlying strata fracture and collapse,
freeing CBM to move upward and out of the coal.204 Of all methods of
205CBM collection, gob wells are most frequently used. The Alabama
Supreme Court held that only gob wells were part of the surface estate's
interest in coalbed methane because of the physical position of the escaped
206gas.
In an attempt to determine the weight of contract rights on the
extraction of CBM, the Alabama Supreme Court created a two-tiered
ownership model which focused on interests according to how parties
would capture CBM from the ground.207 The Court held that coal
owners/lessees "have the exclusive right to produce and own coalbed
methane gas from horizontal boreholes and vertical degasification wells
drilled directly into the source coal seam."208 At the same time, gas
owners have an "interest in coalbed gas that migrates out of the coal
seams, such as that gas collected within the gob zone." 209 The Court
reached its conclusion by deciding that terms of the conveyance in
question offered a clear showing of parties' ownership intent. However,
the Court determined that absent a clear showing of intent, the in rem laws
of property would apply, namely that a reservation of CBM does not
include CBM contained "within its source coal seam." 210 Thus, Alabama
201 id
202 NCNB Texas Nat. Bank, N.A. v. West, 631 So.2d 212, 215 (Ala. 1993).
203 id
204 id
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maintained an in rem framework for use in cases where intent was
questionable and in personam issues avoidable.
C. The Relational Dynamics between Contract Theory and Property Law
Explained
Arguably, no better analysis exists to explain the relational
dynamics between contract theory and property law, as it pertains to
mineral law principles, than Merrill and Smith's work on The
Property/Contract Interface.211 Therefore, ideas from their work are used
here to explain the seemingly chaotic and, at times, nonsensical efforts of
the courts in deciding coalbed methane ownership. Application of some
of the authors' basic principles to the issues of mineral ownership provides
a much clearer understanding of why competing and inconsistent legal
determinations have been made in courts across the country, as judges
decide the question of "Who owns coalbed methane gas?"
The question "Who owns coalbed methane gas?" has not been easy
to answer in recent mineral ownership cases. Much of the reason lies in
the historic combining of contract and property theory into the field of
early mineral law, a "hybrid partaking of some of the features of property
rights and some of the features of contract rights." 212 As a result, modem
issues of mineral ownership inescapably experience what Merrill and
Smith call the "interface dilemma," or "muddled blend of principles" 213
resulting from competing contract and property theories as adopted into
early American mineral law. An uneasy and perhaps unnatural interface
of the two has succeeded, however, in creating stringent systemic
protection for coal mineral in the courts for more than a century, and is
omnipresent in virtually all coal controversies even today. Without
exception, intrinsic "interface" issues still lurk behind each coal mineral
deed conveyed almost a century later, particularly as contract issues grow
in complexity.
Parsing out meaningful explanations for the "interface dilemma"
requires understanding basic legal principles of contract and property law
148
211 See generally Merrill, supra note 2.
212 Id. at 777.
213 Id. at 779.
EQUITY ILLUSION OF SURFACE OWNERSHIP IN CBM OWNERSHIP
and how they function comparatively. The difference, initially, between
contract theory and property law is the question, "To whom is a party
bound?" 214 Essentially, differences in the answer are matters of the kind
of relationships parties to a conveyance have with each other.
To begin, "[c]ontract rules are generally default rules,"215 called to
bear on contracting parties only when an agreement has gone awry. In
other words, people are free to customize216 the terms of a contract in any
manner without effectuating contract rules unless they are invoked for
reasons such as breech of contract or failure of the agreement. Property
law, in contrast, requires that parties to a real property agreement define
the nature of their legal rights at the start, from which everyone else is
automatically excluded through public forms of disclosure or notice
rules.217 Property rights are generally defined through documentary
processes, like deeds, in which parties "adopt one of a limited number of
standard forms that define the legal dimensions of [a property]
relationship." 218 A contract, on the other hand, is as informal and private
as parties wish to make it.
In contract law, a party binds the person or persons with whom she
contracts as a holder of "in personam" rights. 2 19 Conversely, in property
law, a holder of real property binds "the rest of the world"220 with the duty
not to infringe against her enjoyment of private ownership, or possession,
as the case may be. "In rem" or real property rights are generally guided
by immutable forms or rules of standard legal behavior. 1 As such, in
rem principles are often bright line rules with clear dimensions, and not
generally subject to revision by agreement. 222
Another aspect of the relationship between contract theory and
property law is the nature of the goals for performing the obligations of
legal acts. In personam rights are affirmative reciprocal obligations to
214 See id. at 776-77.
215 Id. at 776.
2 16 id.
217 d.
218 d2 19 Id. at 776-77.
220 Id. at 777.
221 Id. at 778.
222 Id. at 799-804.
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223perform or to uphold a specific duty. By contrast, in rem rights are
"negative in character" 224 and "require that persons [not holding the
rights] abstain from certain types of interference." 225 They are rights of
226
exclusion, meant to disavow use and enjoyment by others not holding
the right. In rem rights associated with tangible property are all claims
that exclude others and prevent others from performing certain acts. 227
Creating exclusionary interests in ownership was an early goal for real
property owners of mineral rights.228 Applying in rem theory to coalbed
methane case law illustrates the significance courts have historically
placed on exclusionary rights in mineral ownership.
1. Applying In Rem Theory to CBM Case Law
Early coalbed methane ownership decisions tended to articulate
legal principles in support of in rem rights. Courts who decided
ownership rights of CBM in favor of coal owners were approaching the
issues from the legal locus of classic in rem property rights. Essentially,
when coalbed methane gas is owned by the coal owner it assures against
the interference of other property users in coal mining operations, via the
protection of uniform property law. Specifically, early courts were
interested in excluding competing estate interests from the rights
associated with safety practices and extraction rights of miners and mine
operators.
Language was replete in Hoge, West, and Moss with discourse
addressing the in rem rights of coal producers. 229 For example, in 1983,
the Hoge Court used absolute language to impose real property rights in
the ownership of CBM. The Court held that "[g/as as is present in coal
must necessarily belong to the owner of the coal, so long as it remains
22 31d. at 789.
224 id.225 id.
226 Id. at 793.
227Id. at 789.
228 Wenzel, supra note 176, at 623.
229 See U.S. Steel Corp. v. Hoge, 468 A.2d 1380 (Pa. 1983); NCNB Tex. Nat'1 Bank N.A.
v. West, 631 So.2d 212 (Ala. 1993); Energy Dev. Corp. v. Moss, 591 S.E.2d 135 (W. Va.
2003).
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within his property and subject to his exclusive dominion and control." 23 0
The holding in the subsequent West case illustrates the effect of Hoge's
prescriptive precedent:
[O]mission of any specific reference to Coalbed Gas in the
Center Coal Deeds and the need for uniformity and
predictability in the law of real property and minerals
require this Court to declare, as a matter of law, whether
Coalbed Gas belongs to coal owners/lessees. 23 1
By holding in favor of coal owners, the West Court reiterated the
importance of uniformity in the relevant property rule, as follows:
To the extent that any minor distinctions in facts or
rationale exist between Hoge and the cases at bar, they are
outweighed by the need for continuity and predictability in
the law of real property. 232
Clearly, early courts decided CBM cases with the intent that in rem
mineral rights were black-letter in nature. The agenda of setting precedent
was an important goal for these courts. In a theoretical sense, setting
precedent for CBM extraction was important generally because
standardizing in rem rules is a necessary step if they are to be widely
obeyed. 233 In large part, legal conventions of mining law were rooted so
deeply in American property jurisprudence specifically because they were
precedential in nature, as functions of in rem rights.
As mentioned, early courts interpreted issues based in large part on
the social conventions of the mining industry. For example, in Moss, the
West Virginia Supreme Court lamented the loss of coal miners to
explosions attributed to coalbed methane.
230 Hoge, 468 A.2d at 1383.
231 West, 631 So.2d at 217.
232 Id. at 218.
233 Merrill, supra note 2 at 796.
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Coalbed methane has long been regarded as one of
a coal miner's greatest foes . . . may have produced more
widows and orphans than any other workplace hazard . . .
leaving 362 dead in the Monongah Mine Disaster in 1907,
the worst mining disaster in American history.2 34
In addition, the West Virginia Supreme Court summarized the
Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act, the Black Lung Compensation
Law, and the West Virginia Code as support for its decision. The Court's
holding reflected "the highest possible priority placed upon the safety of
miners and due consideration given to our long established case law
regarding mineral interests." 235
Clearly, early courts were interested in retaining in rem rights for
the benefit of workers in the mining industry. In practice, in rem courts
implemented what Merrill calls exclusion strategies in their discussions in
order to "restrict[ ] access to a particular resource," 236  namely coal.
These efforts are apparent in the West case where the Alabama Supreme
Court determined "it is not the role of this Court to disturb existing
property rights by redefining existing property law in order to promote
economic efficiency." 237
Property rights are a fairly static system of laws, and as such are
very old and slow to change. They implicate broad groups of persons who
must honor exclusive rights of ownership. Because of this, there are
benefits to building mineral law from in rem rules of property.
The Benefits of In rem Theory in Mineral Law
Clear benefits exist to following in rem rules of property in mineral
law. As described, in rem rules are generally bright line rules which settle
into law as standard benchmarks. Real property law is time honored and
future minded, framing property rights for future generations. As a result,
black letter law eases the burden of judicial interpretation of issues
sparked by one generation and experienced by the next. As discussed, in
rem rules are exclusionary. The rules are protective. In rem rules err
234 Energy Dev. Corp. v. Moss, 591 S.E.2d 135, 142 (W. Va. 2003).23s1d. at 143.
236 Merrill, supra note 2 at 791.237NCNB Tex. Nat'l Bank N.A. v. West, 631 So.2d 212, 227 (Ala. 1993).
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against short term contractual agreements which modify the original intent
of parties to a conveyance. Perhaps the best example of long term
protection in rem can be seen through the issue of liability.
In rem theory is oriented toward defining and assessing liability.
Since at least the late 1800s, with the signing of the first federal coal mine
safety laws, the mining industry has been indentured to prevent disasters
associated with the volatile nature of coalbed methane gas. Early in this
history, deeds were generally written with the clear understanding that
coal producers were liable for damage due to coalbed methane explosions
and loss of life. This natural liability followed coal production rights as
they were ascribed in mining law of the time, surface access issues
notwithstanding.
To take the liability example further, classic property law is where
early courts looked to improve protections to surface estates through tort
laws of.trespass, nuisance, and negligence.238 When courts stepped in to
construct a strict liability theory for subjacent support of split estate
surface lands, they used classic property law theory to broadly shape those
protections for land users.239 The history of broad form deeds is one case
in point proving that, left to their own devices, surface owners have
historically been sorely inept at negotiating contract protections for
property transfers. 240
Hazards of In Rem Theory in Mineral Law
Even with tort protections, damage to surface lands due to the
encroaching access needs of mineral producers has been a problem poorly
managed by in rem theory. Much of the problem is the inherent nature of
in rem theory itself. Once mineral estate dominance established access
rights superior to surface ownership, in rem theory perpetuated those
rights as immutable protections in mineral production. 41 On this basis,
scholars have searched and courts have attempted to construct an evolved
contract theory to increase surface owners' ability to improve use and
enjoyment of their lands. The result has been judicial practices estranged
from real property rules.
238 Wenzel, supra note 176, at 628-29.23 9 Id. at 627-28.
240 Id. at 627-29.
241 Id.
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2. Applying In Personam Theory to CBM Case Law
Supreme courts in the west have staunchly supported in personam
theories of CBM ownership. By the time the issue of CBM ownership
came before the Montana Supreme Court, over a decade after Hoge, the
maiden case's holding had complexified, as had Montana's statutory law
regarding the mining of coalbed methane. In Carbon County, the
Montana Supreme Court noted the following recent change in Montana
state law:
[T]he legislature inserted a new section into the Montana
Code to insure that all instruments regarding coal, oil and
gas are interpreted according to sec. 82-1-111, MCA.242
State statutory law opened the door for the Montana Supreme
Court to more easily frame the question of CBM ownership as a contract
issue. As a result, the Montana Supreme Court reversed Carbon County's
lower court ruling favoring coal owners. Montana's lower court originally
determined that coalbed methane "was part of the coal estate."2
Arguably, the State Supreme Court modified the holding on appeal
because of strong language in the new statute which centered legal
interpretation of ownership on the intent of conveyance instruments, and
not on property law.
In 2002, the Wyoming Supreme Court highlighted Montana's
interpretation of CBM ownership as a contract issue. The Court declared
that "[r]ather than following some rigid rule of law, we believe this issue
should be governed by the facts and circumstances surrounding the
execution of this warranty deed." 244 Almost twenty years after Hoge,
CBM ownership clearly evolved into a question of contract theory.
Accordingly, restrictive in rem rights to vent coalbed methane progressed
into affirmative in personam duties to pay royalties to oil and gas owners
of severed estates. In the span of twenty years, the CBM industry has
242 Carbon County v. Union Reserve Coal Co., Inc., 898 P.2d 680, 689 (Mont. 1995)
(emphasis added).
243 Id. at 682 (1995).
244 Newman v. RAG Wyo. Land Co., 53 P.3d 540, 549 (Wyo. 2002).
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figuratively shifted from the land to the pen. This evolution is important
in understanding how the Virginia Supreme Court reached its holding in
Harrison-Wyatt in 2003, by perceiving the benefits of a contract-based
decision.
The Benefits of In Personam Rights in Mineral Law
"Allowing in rem property rights to be supplemented by in
personam contract rights, in particular, introduces an enormously larger
set of options for the use and control of resources than would be possible
using exclusion rights alone." 245 These benefits include a broader range
of performance opportunities and "customization of in personam rights"246
in contract terms. Merrill and Smith add that contract law has a
"majoritarian meaning"247 governin what "most parties would prefer to
adopt to govern their relationship,"2 as measured by a collection of case
by case situations. Scholars call this majoritarian meaning the plain
meaning rule of contracts.
Hazards of In Personam Rights in Mineral Law
Time is relative in contract law whereby "a mutating menu of
default rules" 249 changes over time. The pliability of in personam rules
comes from the fact that only parties to an agreement are bound. 250 Even
large groups of parties can be bound to default rules, like "industry-
specific default rules," 251 for example. Often, the more industry-specific
default rules are, the less likely it is that third parties are negatively
impacted.252 However, with every mutation that occurs, the more difficult
it becomes for third parties to have notice of the rights and responsibilities
involved in a particular menu of rules. 253 As a result, in rem principles,
the "social glue that allows any group of individuals of any size and
245 Merrill, supra note 2 at 797.
246 Id. at 800.
247 d
248 d.
249 Id. at 801.25 id.
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complexity to function on a day-to-day basis," 254 weaken, and can fail in
their functions as limitations on contractual behaviors.255
In the context of real property, affirmative rights without restrictive
protections run the risk of creating a notice regime devoid of ownership
norms and notice requirements.2  Furthermore, contract rights create
inevitable conflict in protecting future interests. Advocates for the pure
contract approach disagree, and suggest that "neither liberty nor efficiency
concerns justify the common law restrictions, or any restrictions, on
contractual freedom to create servitudes that burden successors-in-
interest." 257 Arguably, protests over the place of private agreements in
restricting land use 258 is part of a larger historic debate, perhaps unduly
complexified by the body of mineral law itself.
With that view, Part VI retraces the historical conflict between
contract theory and property law. In the process, the recent phenomena of
functional contract principles re-contractualizing property law will be
addressed.
VI. THE HISTORICAL CONFLICT BETWEEN CONTRACT THEORY AND
MINERAL LAW
Courts have relied on specific principles of property law in
deciding mineral cases since the birth of the mining industry in early
America. As noted, early cases deciding mineral ownership conferred
corporeal interests on mineral extractors, and the principle of mineral
estate dominance gave them the freedom to produce, virtually without
restriction. Mineral theory, therefore, is very much the product of early
American energy policy and activist judicial intervention which
entrenched mineral law in a definitively property-esque paradigm.
In coalbed methane cases, recent courts have attempted to
deconstruct traditional theories of mineral law and the law of oil and gas
254 1d at 795.
255 id.
256 Richard Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL.
L. REv. 1353, 1357 (1982).
257 Id. at 1358-60 (1982).
258 Sterk, supra note 29, at 616.
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in order to adjudicate issues as modem contract principles. In this effort,
courts have collided with historical legal barriers protecting mineral
ownership, barriers created primarily by property/contract interface issues.
These barriers arise most often as the cumulative effect of early judicial
manipulation of contract-like conveyancing practices in mining law.
A. Early Property Law Diminished "Contract-like Relationships"259
Historically, contract-like relationships were severed from the law
of deeds for the sake of implementing a new legal paradigm for mineral
law.260 Early American courts integrated in rem theory into contract-like
relationships dealing with real property ownership in order to make
mineral conveyance more property-esque.261 Courts' corporeal treatment
of subterranean mineral rights was the initial step toward defining split
estate relationships and mainstreaming emerging mineral laws of
conveyancing. These property-esque relationships included "rules relating
to transferability and divisibility, implications of adverse use, the right to
use mined-out space for a continuing mining operation on other lands, and
immunity from application of rules relating to abandonment." 262 Judicial
constructs of mineral law, for example, have historically eschewed
abandonment and adverse possession claims 263 against mineral owners to
such a degree that eventually "legislatures in several states were forced to
adopt statutes to deal with these problems."264
Essentially, constructs of mineral law were molded to observe
early corporeal treatment of subterranean mineral estates. This being the
case, some scholars see an historical error in early courts' decisions to
265make mineral ownership interests corporeal. The result is a historic
disconnect between contract theory and mineral law. With the assistance
of extensive research by David Pierce, it becomes clear that explicit
severance of contract theory from mineral law can be found in three
259 Polston, supra note 139, at 569.
260id
261 Id. at 546.
262 Id. at 556-57.
263 d
2 Id. at 566.
265 Id. at 568-69.
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primary situations: (1) implied covenants in mineral leasing; (2) energy
custom and trade usage; and (3) parol evidence rules.
1. Implied Covenants Were Used as Equitable Instruments
Mineral leasing practices have not historically followed the law of
contracts with any exclusivity. Rather, implied covenants or "unwritten
promises that generally impose burdens on lessees" 266 have been used to
normalize general intent language in mineral leasing agreements. Implied
covenants have historically functioned as generalizing principles for split
estate relationships within the mining industry. Generally, implied
covenants hold lessees to a "prudent operator" standard under general
leasing terms of a mineral contract.267 Absent specific contract language,
"the lessee must act as a 'prudent operator,' which includes not only
technical competence, but also an awareness of the dual lessor/lessee
interests it must promote." 268  For example, with evidence of
demonstrable risk to a lessor's liability due to lessee's activities, the
prudent lessee may have to alter its operating practices269 as an
idiosyncrasy of oil and gas law.
In his research on oil and gas law, David Pierce explains that
"dynamics of the oil and gas lease, and the evolution of the law of oil and
gas, provide a jurisprudential laboratory to evaluate why and how courts
react to situations they believe require their equitable intervention." 270
The habit of equitable intervention was prompted by early scholarly
arguments which viewed leases between landowners and oil producers the
result of inherently unequal bargaining power. 271 The resulting disregard
for "four corners" arguments in oil and gas law is the consequence of a
convention of equity in mineral law which standardizes general intent
2661avid E. Pierce, The Impact ofLandowner/Lessor Environmental Risk on Oil and Gas
Lessee Rights and Obligations, 31 Tulsa L.J. 731, 746-47 (1996).
267 Pierce, supra note 266, at 746.
2681d. at 746 (1996); see also JoHN S. LOWE, OIL AND GAS LAW IN A NUTSHELL 36-48
(3d ed. 1995).
269 Pierce, supra note 266, at 747.
270 David E. Pierce, The Renaissance ofLaw in the Law of Oil and Gas: The Contract
Dimension, 42 WASHBURN L.J. 909, 937 (2004).
271 Id. at 911.
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presumptions by parsing out vital interests in mineral leases. 272  The
problem with this kind of equitable intervention is the presumption of
mineral estate dominance, which has caused greater formalization of
implied covenants and thereby diminished judicial discretion to re-
contractualize challenged terms of lease agreements in question. 27 3
In contract law generally, language in a deed of conveyance is
strictly construed by the courts against the grantor in favor of the grantee.
However, in oil and gas leases, absent specifics, langage is liberally
construed in favor of the lessor and against the lessee. 4 In fact, absent
specific contract language, an oil and gas lease does not give the oil and
gas lessee the right to drill into the lessor's coal seams to produce coalbed
methane gas, which is a standard application in oil and gas law.275
Another of these conventions is the judicial practice of granting extra
protection for lessors through royalty sharing benefits under oil and gas
leases. 276 This turn of the rules illustrates the nature of implied covenants
in oil and gas law in effect since the turn of the twentieth century. 27 7 The
irregular nature of implied covenants in mineral law often does little,
however, to improve contract language or to equalize bargaining power in
many cases.
2. Custom and Usage Permeate Conventions of Mineral Law
In the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, the term usage means a
"habitual or customary practice." 278 David Pierce, the author of Defining
the Role of Industry Custom and Usage in Oil & Gas Litigation,2
explains that usage is not a legal rule but a "practice in fact."2 '0 When
272 Id. at 937-39.
273 Id.
274 Id. at 918.
27 51 d. at 916.276 Id. at 927-929.
277 Pierce, supra, note 266 at 746; see Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 140 F. 801, 814 (8th
Cir. 1905).
278 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 219 (1981).
279 David E. Pierce, Defining the Role ofIndustry Custom and Usage in Oil & Gas
Litigation, 57 SMU. L. REv. 387 (2004).
280 Id. at 390.
159
Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv., Vol. 16, No. I
parties in contract are engaged in a trade, they are presumed to know or
have reason to know about the circumstances surrounding the trade
industry.2 81
Problematically, "[w]hat some courts define as 'industry usage'
may be better described as an acknowledgement of past 'judicial usage' in
dealing with a particular problem." 282 Pierce calls this judicial practice
"custom-as-law analysis," 283 where usage is treated as "part of the
common law." 284  The problem lies in a court's adoption of legal
conclusions based on inaccurate usage information taken from "assertions
of counsel" 285 or "the judge's general knowledge." 286 Occurrences such
as these often take place over issues involving deed reservation language
where a court majority "relies on historical information concerning custom
and usage to determine both the ambiguity of the term minerals and its
meaning."287 In fact, mineral cases are replete with judicial practices of
historicizing public energy policy and referencing custom and usage
practices, often as gap fillers for indirect evidence.288 Arguably,
conventions of mining law sprang into use in order to minimize contract
issues of ambiguity. Early courts diminished ambiguity by piecemeal
adoption and often judicial construction of early mining practices and
"camp" rules.289
3. Mineral Cases Complexified Parol Evidence Rules
Parol evidence is a limiting rule which prevents use of extrinsic or
concurrent evidence in the interpretation of contract language. 290
Generally, parol evidence does not work to limit trade custom and usage
281 Id. at 391; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 220(1) (1982), 222(3)
(1981).
282 Pierce, supra note 279, at 427.2831Id. at 428.
284 id
285 Id. at 407.
286 id,2871 d at 468.
288 Id at 450.
289 Id. at 427-28.
290 1d. at 393-94.
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evidence, nor does it limit surrounding circumstances evidence in mineral
291law cases. Surrounding circumstances evidence is a hallmark of
mineral litigation. 292 The practice is in accordance with the Restatement
(Second) of Property which states that interpretation of conveyance
language should be made "in light of the circumstances of its
formation." 293
Generally, a court that uses property rules to analyze an issue of
mineral law is likely to construct its argument based on findings as general
rules, surrounding circumstances, and matters of law.294  There has
emerged, however, an opposing approach, which David Pierce calls the
"procedural contract principles" 29 approach. The "procedural contract
approach" 296 focuses exclusively on the intent of the parties to a
conveyance.297
Of primary concern in mineral cases today, is the inconsistency
with which any approach uses parol evidence to ascertain relevant
"surrounding circumstances" of the conveyance in question. Often, for
courts applying general rules and matters of mineral law, "[p]ublic policy
and common sense . . . step in when legal jargon fails." 298 Traditionally,
the goal has been uniformity in the practice of mineral conveyancing.299
The same is not the case under the procedural contract approach.3oo Under
the contract approach, the plain meaning rule can diminish or even
exclude from evidence usage of trade "not adopted by the contracting
parties in the terms of the contract itself."3 o0  As a result, the inconsistent
use of parol evidence rules in recent mineral law cases has created a host
of evidentiary issues, the least of which is when to allow circumstantial
291 Id. at 393-99
29 2Id. at 426.
293 Id. at 398; see also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 242 (1940).294 David E. Pierce, Evaluating the Jurisprudential Bases for Ascertaining or Defining
Coalbed Methane Ownership, 4 WYo. L. REv. 607, 609 (2004).295 Id. at 612.
296 id.
297 d.
298 Rowley, supra note 135, at 116.
299 Pierce, supra note 294, at 612.
301 id.
301 Rowley, supra note 135, at 116.
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evidence to fill in the gaps of conveyance language.302 At present, courts
are running anarchical on this issue.
B. Functional Theories are Re-contractualizing Property Law
As described, courts have strayed from using implied covenants
and incidental rights analysis in recent CBM ownership cases. Cases in
Montana, Wyoming, and Virginia are evidence of courts' adoption of the
procedural contract approach 303 for deciding CBM ownership issues.
"This approach is concerned with one thing: the intent of the parties to the
document." 304 To this end, "courts have generally assumed that
uniformity of result and predictability, in the contract setting, are not all
that important."3 05 Arguably, Montana, Wyoming, and Virginia agree,
and have employed the plain meaning doctrine almost exclusively as the
bases for recent mineral decisions. 306
The recent shift away from property law and mineral practices
toward contract rules of conveyancing illustrates a clear judicial
preference for the interpretation of CBM conveyances as negotiated
agreements born of mutual rights. Recognition of mutual rights to
mineral, oil and gas ownership has resulted in states' implementation of
statutory construction laws for standardizing interpretations of mineral
conveyance language and in the institutionalization of gas pooling
agreements between common owners.
1. Mutual Simultaneous Rights Doctrine
The Supreme Court of Montana introduced the premise of mutual
rights of mineral ownership to the CBM extraction issue. Montana
introduced the doctrine of "mutual simultaneous right"307 as the collective
right of both surface and mineral estate owners of property to capture
302 Pierce, supra note 294, at 612-13.




307 Carbon County v. Union Reserve Coal Co., 898 P.2d 680, 689 (Mont. 1995).
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coalbed methane gas. The Supreme Court of Colorado echoed this idea
shortly thereafter, holding that "[b]oth estates are mutually dominant and
mutually servient because each is burdened with the rights of the
other."308  Ultimately, the Virginia Supreme Court highlighted the
doctrine in Harrison- Wyatt.30 9
Today, the states of Montana, Colorado, and Virginia have adopted
a presumption of mutuality into the litany of mineral law. The
presumption of mutuality infers a positive gain and mutual benefit for both
lessors and lessees in the extraction of CBM, whereby ownership rights
are protected by good faith capture and sale. 310  Mutual simultaneous
rights doctrine reinforces the bi-lateral nature of mineral agreements
which presumes arms length negotiation between parties."' With the
advent of the mutual simultaneous rights doctrine, courts have begun to
revise historically implied rights of mineral owners. This was clear in
Justice Kennedy's remarks in Amoco when he determined that venting
methane gas may be an implied right of coal mining but in no way implies
ownership rights in the gas.312
The advent of mutual simultaneous rights theory of capture has
changed the nature of incidental rights of mineral ownership, arguably
creating a relational theory of ownership shared between estate holders, in
tandem. 3 13 With this turn, mineral dominance doctrine has evolved in
effect from an absolute right to extract CBM as a safety issue into a shared
right, and potential duty, to extract CBM mutually or bi-laterally in a
growing number of states. 3 14  The result is a new kind of CBM
"possessor-producer" who must negotiate with others on how best to
produce a migratory fuel controlled by any number of estate holders at any
given time during extraction. As part of this evolution, mutual
simultaneous rights are increasingly decided by the language of state
statutory construction laws.
308 Gerrity Oil & Gas Corp. v. Magness, 946 P.2d 913, 927 n.8 (Colo. 1997).
3 See generally Harrison-Wyatt v. Ratliff, 593 S.E.2d 234 (Va. 2004).
310 Union Reserve Coal Co, 898 P.2d at 689.
311 Harrison- Wyatt, 593 S.E.2d at 554-55.
312 Amoco Prod. Co. v. S. Ute Indian Tribe, 526 U.S. 865, 879 (1999).
313 See Harrison- Wyatt, 593 S.E.2d at 555.
314 Union Reserve Coal Co, 898 P.2d at 689.
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2. State Statutory Construction Laws
Some states are formalizing rules for interpreting mineral
conveyance language through state statutory construction laws. The
Montana Supreme Court relied on new state statutory guidelines to decide
the question of CBM ownership in Carbon County. In fact, after the trial
court's ruling in Carbon County, but before the Supreme Court's decision,
the state statutory definitions of coal, oil and gas changed with a new
provision to the Montana Code (MCA). 3 15  "In 1993, the Montana
Legislature deleted the definition of gas from the state code, and added
"gas means all natural gases . . . including methane gas." 316 Further,
language outlines that "coal" means a combustible carbonaceous rock ...
coal does not include: (a) methane gas . . ."3 Against the backdrop of
the Carbon County case, Montana's statute mandates that "all instruments
regarding coal, oil and gas are interpreted according to section 82-1-111,
MCA." 8
The primary problem with new state statutory construction laws is
the tendency to function retroactively. 3 19 In other words, courts have
tended to apply new statutory language to conveyance issues with less
regard for surrounding circumstances evidence relevant to the instruments
in question at the time they were created. Therefore, judicial use of recent
statutory construction laws diminishes the likelihood that in rem
arguments will apply. In short, legislative efforts to tie mutual
simultaneous rights to mineral ownership have courts embracing strict
contract theory via new statutory construction laws. These efforts have
created new extraction rights, as well as construction laws. 320  Forced
pooling is one example. 32 1
31s Id. at 682.
6 Id. at 689.
3 id.
318 MONTANA CODE ANN. § 1-4-110 (1993).
3 E.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 1-4-110 (1993).
320 S. Ryan White, Who Owns Coalbed Methane in West Virginia?, 107 W. VA. L. REv.
603, 617-18 (2005).
321 Jeff L. Lewin, supra note 20, at 670-7 1.
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3. Forced Pooling
Some courts have held there is "no common law correlative right
for property owners to equitably share in the production of the common
gas pool." 22 Therefore, states have enacted forced pooling statutes in
large part to "circumvent the obstacle posed by uncertain ownership." 323
Essentially, forced pooling requires that all potential owners of
coalbed methane gas in the same drilling area or unit acquiesce to CBM
extraction from their subsurface property. 324 In most cases, producers in
pooling states can extract CBM without knowing exactly who else shares
rights in the production. 3 25 As a result, mutual owners who find out later
of a shared claim are often restricted to a statutory share in production of
generally 8% or 9%, by law. 32 6
Forced pooling has been legislated in most states (with such a law)
as a primary tool for increasing CBM production. 327 With pooling laws in
place, CBM extraction does not require proving shared ownership interests
before operations begin.3 28 As one of the first states to implement forced
pooling laws, Virginia's enactment of the Gas and Oil Act in 1990 caused
state production to increase "dramatically." 329 One reason, "[t]he Virginia
Oil and Gas Act purports to authorize a tighter spacing of CBM wells than
is allowed for ordinary shallow gas wells." 330
Modeled after Virginia's Gas and Oil Act, the federal legislature
subsequently enacted the National Energy Policy Act of 1992 (NEPA)
which mandates forced pooling for states "where the Secretary of the
Interior finds that uncertainty over ownership is impeding CBM
development. "3 3  "Affected" 332 states are given the choice to use NEPA
or create their own pooling statutes, without exception.
322 S. Ryan White, supra note 320, at 605.
323 Jeff L. Lewin, supra note 20, at 669-70.
324 id.
325 id.326 Id. at 670.
327 Id.
328 Id.
3291 d. at 671.
310 Id. at 678.
331 Id. at 671.
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These statutes facilitate CBM production by:
(1) allowing CBM to be produced by any persons who
claims to own an interest in CBM, without requiring them
to conclusively prove ownership; (2) minimizing the risk
for persons who produce CBM in the face of disputed
ownership claims by limiting their liability to payment of a
fair royalty or share of the profits if it is later determined
that they are not the owners; and (3) protecting the rights of
all persons claiming an ownership interest in CBM by
establishing an escrow fund to hold their share of royalties
or profits pending resolution of competing ownership
claims. 333
Forced pooling, however, diminishes surface owners' ability to
negotiate favorable terms in a lease agreement because of inherent benefits
to lessees through forced pooling. 334 For example, a lessee will generally
attempt to negotiate a pooling clause with lessor landowners which
benefits the lessee by generalizing extraction efforts to all acreage in a
particular space of land, or unit. 335  If a lessee is not successful in
negotiating a lease with a pooling clause, then forced pooling is the
functional equivalent, and can be used as an exclusive benefit to
contracting lessees. 336
Through his research on oil and gas leases, Joseph Shade has
discovered that pooling clauses benefit lessees in a number of ways. First,
a pooling clause "allows the lessee to combine acreage from two or more
leases together to form spacing units."337 Second, a pooling clause can
332 Id. at 672. Lewin lists Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee and
West Virginia as states affected by issues of uncertainty over CBM ownership. Id. at
671-72. NEPA excludes Alabama, Louisiana, Utah, Virginia, Washington and Wyoming
from federal coverage. Id. at 672.
3 Id. at 670.
334 Joseph Shade, The Oil & Gas Lease and ADR: A Marriage Made in Heaven Waiting
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modify the royalty clause by providing for "apportioning royalty on the
basis of the surface acres from the respective leases contained in the unit
[acreage]."338  "Pugh clauses," on the other hand, restrict a lessee's
right to extract from more than the actual leased acreage. 34 However,
favorable terms generally found in a negotiated Pugh Clause are not
inherent in statutory forced pooling laws. 34 1 Therefore, lessors experience
diminished bargaining power under forced pooling, even though
protections are created to balance returns on produced minerals.
Moreover, under forced pooling, lessor landowners have little or no
control over infringing producers. 343 Often, landowners "suffer increased
environmental risk as a result of unit development" 344 with little
environmental protection since "status-based environmental statutes do
not exempt forced pooling." 34 5 Most problematically, "the existence of
forced pooling does not eliminate the extraction-related conflicts between
CBM development and coal mining that may arise whenever CBM
development is undertaken by a claimant who is not the owner of the coal
,,346
rights. Forced pooling statutes, therefore, are often protective rhetoric
with an underlying agenda of maximizing mineral production while
creating a host of extraction issues for multiple-owner producers.
Against the backdrop of state action, Part V looks at the big picture
in coalbed methane production as it affects the nation. This section
addresses health and safety issues surrounding split estate mineral
production, ending with a close look at the current state of CBM
production in the Powder River Basin of Montana and Wyoming, the area
of fastest production growth today.
13 1 d at 610.
39 Id. at 611. Shade describes that a Pugh clause "is to partially negate a pooling clause.
The Pugh clause modifies the usual pooling language to provide that operations or
production from a pooled unit will not hold the whole lease, but rather will only maintain




343 Id. at 610-11.
3 Pierce, supra note 287, at 749.
345 id
3 Lewin, supra note 20, at 674.
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V. THE BIG PICTURE IN COALBED METHANE PRODUCTION
Recognizing the progression of CBM ownership rights from in ren
to in personam is important for understanding the impact on mineral rights
that America's thrust for new energy resources has brought to the modem
day landowner. The bundle of rights that is property law follows bright
line rules, 347 which are generally resistant to revision. 348 However, bright
line rules are being revised in the law of minerals as a result of CBM case
law. Greater focus now falls on the actual intent of bi-lateral contracts of
present day estate holders, particularly with respect to leasing instruments.
As a result, limited but existing safeguards in property jurisprudence are
being reframed by ownership theories of contract.
In the case of CBM ownership issues, the effect of new surface
ownership rights is a very real restructuring of applications of mineral law
and a purposeful redirection in the relationships people have with law and
with the land. The law's new direction is failing to improve the real time
health and safety of surface landowners, however. In short, focus on
ownership has done little to improve equitable land use. The reason why
is that courts have failed to address extraction rights and responsibilities
of competing estate holders. Greater emphasis on statutory law to regulate
mineral production has proved ineffective in protecting landowners.
Courts have compounded the problem by its refusal to address key
extraction issues necessary to truly balancing the power between newly
delegated CBM owners. The result is a growing concern over the
management of coalbed methane production on a national scale.
A. Health and Safety Hazards Abound
1. Questions of Shifting Liability Are Problematic
The biggest problem in the evolution of extraction rights may be
the unresolved legal issues of liability and compensation for venting
and/or capture of CBM from active mines. In CBM litigation courts are
unified in leaving these issues unaddressed. For example, the court in
347 MeTill, supra note 2, at 803.
348 Id. at 802.
168
EQUITY ILLUSION OF SURFACE OWNERSHIP IN CBM OWNERSHIP
Montana's Carbon County case "[left] to the agreement of the parties or to
some future case the issue of whether, and if so, to what extent, the gas
estate owner or lessee is entitled to be compensated by the coal owner for
gas extracted incident to the coal owner's mining operations." 349 in
Harrison-Wyatt, Virginia declined to express an opinion on the rights of
surface owners to fracture coal owned by mineral producers for the
purpose of retrieving CBM.350 While courts in Pennsylvania, Alabama,
and West Virginia were highly constrained by liability issues in mineral
theory, which were closely tied to rules of property law, courts in
Montana, Wyoming, and Virginia have not wrestled with such
constraints.35 1  In other words, the trend toward re-contractualizing
mineral issues clearly benefits production rights to the exclusion of
liability issues.
Arguably, haste for production preoccupied the Amoco Court to
such a degree that it treated liability as a non issue. Justice Ginsberg was
the sole dissenting opinion in the Amoco case. She argued the single
proposition of liability.
As the Court recognizes, in 1909 and 1910 coalbed
methane gas (CBM) was a liability. . . Congress did not
contemplate that the surface owner would be responsible
for it. More likely, Congress would have assumed that the
coal owner had dominion over, and attendant responsibility
for, CBM. I do not find it clear that Congress understood
dominion would shift if and when the liability became an
asset.352
Careful reading of the dissent illustrates the likelihood that
prevailing Justices either did not understand or did not value the nature of
the liability issue involved in deciding Amoco. The decision's author,
Justice Kennedy, equivocated on the matter of liability. Kennedy
determined that "it may be true ... that the right to mine the coal implies
349 Carbon County v. Union Reserve Coal Co., 898 P.2d 680, 689 (Mont. 1995).
3so Harrison-Wyatt v. Ratliff, 593 S.E.2d 234, 238 (Va. 2004).
351 Lewin, supra note 20, at 672.
352 Amoco Prod. Co. v. S. Ute Indian Tribe, 526 U.S. 865, 880 (1999).
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the right to release gas incident to coal mining where it is necessary and
reasonable to do so."353 In reality, however, it must be true that the right
to mine implies the right to release CBM. Entrenched in both the legal
history and the public policy of American mining law is the inherent
liability of coal producers for the prevention of health and safety hazards
inescapably associated with coal production. Either Justice Kennedy was
wholly uninformed of that condition in mineral law or the question of
liability was clearly a non issue. Whatever the reason, the Supreme
Court's decision to shift the benefit of production without the attached
liability was a bold re-contractualization of mineral law. The outcome
was impractical, inequitable, and harmful to an increasingly
conglomerated network of split estate owners. In real terms, real property
rights attach to the land and move with ownership of the land. When this
natural construct is disturbed, intricacies of rights and duties inherent in
the bundle of sticks paradigm divide unnaturally from the land. Chaos is
the result, in the courts and across communities.
Amoco marks an eerie trend in the dissociation of rights to produce
from duties to protect and prevent. CBM ownership cases after Amoco
have carried this dissociation into state law. Virginia's Harrison- Wyatt
decision held that title to CBM remains with the surface owner, with no
discussion of attendant liability. As a result, plaintiff surface owners were
distributed production royalties without caution against liability inherent
in new ownership status. Clearly, focus on the duty to ventilate for health
and safety purposes has evolved into issues of equitable entitlements to
captured gas, raising questions about the nature of shifting and potentially
shared liability between multiple possessor-producers of CBM. The issue
goes beyond questions of ownership to concerns over multiple possessor
rights and responsibilities of conglomerate estate holders in severed estate
relationships.
Questions of liability between conglomerate possessor-producers
of CBM are problematic primarily because recent CBM case law is
inconsistent with a host of established state and federal statutory
regulations and with mineral theory itself.354 Therefore, mineral law is an
increasingly alien practice in courts like Wyoming, Montana, and
353 Id. at 879 (emphasis added).
354 See, e.g., Harrison- Wyatt, 267 Va. 549.
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Virginia.355 Generally, where liability is discounted so too is
environmental protection. For example, "[u]nlike the coal and hard rock
mining industries, which must post a bond to cover the cost of potential
damages before mining, the CBM industry is only required to post bonds
that cover the cost of plugging and abandoning a well."3 56 This example
illustrates the potential collision between coal producers and gas owners
over production liability. Key questions remain. How should surface
owners, with their many varying CBM interests, cover the cost of potential
damages inherent in these conglomerate mineral estates? Furthermore, do
these conglomerate estate holders themselves have the wear-with-all to
safely and equitably negotiate safety issues? And, if legal liability is so
easily ignored, how much easier is it to ignore protections for communities
and the environment?
In short, courts' progressive interest in contractualizing mining
relationships between split estate possessor-producers is not packaged
with clearly defined rights and responsibilities for new owners of coalbed
methane gas. Further, mining practices and regulatory law may lack the
initiative to add even more complexity to mineral policy, which a shifting
liability paradigm of conglomerate estate holders requires.
2. States that are Property Rights Poor Add to the Problem
Concern over unsettled questions of shifting liability in CBM
development is compounded by inadequate surface protection laws. States
that are property rights poor have failed to develop concurrent legal and
statutory protections for landowners in concert with the rapid pace and
advanced technological mechanization of mineral production.
Theoretically, the common law presumption of mineral dominance is
balanced today by state statutory measures to reduce excessive surface
exploitation during mineral production. However, as described, only a
handful of states subscribe to protective measures, like the
Accommodation Doctrine, however. 357 In addition, only a handful more
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have legislated surface damage acts.3 58  Surface damage acts are
legislative attempts to improve accommodation measures on split estate
lands through private land use agreements between split estate owners.
The state of Virginia has neither a policy of accommodation for alternative
access to surface lands, 359 nor has it passed a surface damage act 360 for the
specific purpose of imposing surface protections on mineral producers.
"Since 1975, nine states have adopted surface damage acts. . .
North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, Kentucky, Tennessee, Illinois,
West Virginia and Oklahoma . . .Texas." 361 Clearly, surface use
regulations have not been widely adopted by states, and, arguably, the
reasons are politics and the politics of economics.362 Mineral industries
provide the best form of economic development for many states.
Therefore, state competition for corporate operators tends to temper, if not
control, state regulatory environmental standards and other restrictive
measures which could ward off the mineral industry. 363  According to
Bryan Bank's research on the Appalachian Basin, production comes at the
expense of protection.
The mineral industry [in Appalachia] has always been well
organized... The industry's influence is rapidly expanding
in both state and federal governments. That influence can
be seen in the manner legislatures draft the legislation that
ultimately regulates the industry. 364




361 Id.; see also Jan G. Laitos & Elizabeth H. Getches, Multi-Layered and Sequential,
State and Local Barriers to Extractive Resource Development, 23 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 8
n.18 (2004).
362 Banks, supra note 119, at 154.
363 Id.
3 Id. at 151-52.
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There exists a disconnect between the textbook protections of
surface owners' rights and their actual experiences as protected parties.
Two reasons can be cited for the disjunction: poor regulation of protective
laws, and the overriding benefit to state treasuries of maximized mineral
production.
Courts have moved slowly in their efforts to improve surface
owners' rights to quiet enjoyment. For example, it took the legal system
almost a century to reverse the Supreme Court's finding that a reservation
of subjacent support for surface owners was an unconstitutional denial of
the full ownership rights of coal producers. 365 In the interim, health and
safety concerns such as unmapped wells, unmonitored wells, and small
particle nuisance, to name only a few, have inundated the experience of
land owners.
Of recent concern is the potential for health and safety hazards due
to conglomerations of mineral producers using the same land for different
purposes.
Multiple problems can occur when methane beds are
present in the same lands as oil and gas. . . It often is
difficult for miners to determine the location of past mines
because (1) reporting requirements were not enforced in the
past, (2) 'there is no surface evidence of old well locations,'
and (3) 'the mining industry has yet to develop technology
that will locate existing wells from underground mines.
Single impact issues like these and others combine to create a
comprehensive assault against surface owners' rights to the use and
enjoyment of their lands. Statutory laws designed to protect water and air
have improved protections in some cases, but the failure to effectively
regulate mineral leasing and production activities directly has resulted in
poor mitigation of other serious hazards facing surface owners, even
though laws exist to do so. 367
365 See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); see also, Keystone Bituminous Coal
Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
36 Laitos, supra note 361, at 11.
367 Id.
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The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) was passed in
1969, "chang[ing] the way federal agencies would regulate mining." 368
NEPA set forth the principle that alternatives for federal
actions resulting in environmental impacts must be
examined with public participation and full disclosure. The
law established mechanisms intended to make rational
environmental choices, promote 'productive and enjoyable
harmony between man and his environment,' prevent
damage to the environment, and ensure the health and
welfare of citizens, among other things. 369
Regulatory practices are often poor reflections of NEPA policy,
however. One example of poor regulation is the negative impact of
unconstrained mineral leasing at the federal level. In 2003, a moratorium
was placed on the issuance of new Bureau of Land Management (BLM)
leases for "failure to assess the impact of CBM development on water
quality, soils, and vegetations." 370 The BLM had been in the habit of
approving environmental impact statements, which the Environment
Protection Agency (EPA) discovered to be wholly inadequate.
The EPA... found the Montana EIS [environmental impact
statement] 'environmentally objectionable due to the lack
of specifically identified, economically and technically
feasible water-management practices that are adequate to
assure attainment of water quality standards under the
Clean Water Act' and was even more critical of the
Wyoming EIS, suggesting that while the Montana
document could be remedied, the Wyoming study may
need to be scrapped.37 1
368 Richardson, supra note 3, at 570.369 d
370 Gary C. Bryner, Coalbed Methane Development: The Costs and Benefits ofan
Emerging Energy Resource, 43 NAT. RESOURCES J. 519, 546 (2003).
3n Id. at 546-47 (quoting Scott McMillion, EIS on Coalbed Methane Drilling Blasted,
BOZEMAN CHRON., May 2, 2002).
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Less like areas in the eastern U.S., for example, where mineral
development has a long history and, therefore, experiences more
incremental impact from CBM production, 372 land owners in the west are
experiencing heavy fallout from rapid new mineral exploitation,
compounded by lackadaisical regulatory management. With the surge in
alternative fuel production, surface owners in the intermountain west have
argued that CBM development diminishes their ability to manage their
lands in a "sustainable fashion." 373 Owners argue that "construction and
operation of access roads, drill pads, pipelines, power lines, and
transmission stations produce noise, dust, air pollution, and water
pollution that adversely affect humans and wildlife." 374 The multiplicity
of these effects is virtually unmanageable when surface owners are poorly
informed and underrepresented. Ostensibly, land owners' rights have
been subrogated by fast paced federal leasing mechanisms, which create
affirmative rights in contract with little sensitivity to the practical impact
and long term effect on surface lands. 375  Researcher Gary Bryner
summarizes the severe impact on western basin communities with the
onset of heavy CBM production:
[Landowners] report that they were not given the option to
not sign development agreements, that they were not
notified when subsurface minerals were leased, that surface
lease agreement were not required, that eminent domain
was used to install pipelines, and that communications
towers have been installed without their permission.
[They] also report that there is a lack of planning for
infrastructure needs, a failure to deal with threatened and
endangered species, no planning to protect air quality, little
information sharing with land owners regarding CBM
development, and inadequate bonding, which has
resulted in orphan wells. For these residents, such
oversights do not represent merely damage to their lands
372 Id. at 544.
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and the wasting of scarce and precious water; they also
foster a sense of powerlessness and the violation of
property rights. These residents feel powerless to protect
their lands and ensure their sustainability. 37 6
Economics is the second reason for a growing disconnect in the
inequities of production and protection. The economies of scale have
enticed states to welcome the coalbed methane boom. After the Amoco
decision in June of 1999, CBM production in Wyoming "increased
exponentially." 377 "Wyoming's 1999 state budget deficit was nearly $200
million; when oil and gas prices rose in 2000 ... the budget experienced a
$700 million surplus," 37 earned primarily through royalty interests in
CBM.
In New Mexico, another dense production region, the oil and gas
industry brings in $1.25 billion in state royalties. 379 "In 2000, the federal
government received $211 million in CBM royalties from federal leases . .
. from the San Juan Basin alone."380  "Revenues from oil and gas
production provided approximately 21 percent of New Mexico's general
fund in fiscal year 2002."381
The trend after Amoco is convincing: multiplying the number of
potential producers of CBM through conglomerated ownership
environments increases national energy supplies and funding returns in
triple digits. In short, estate severance has become the gold mine of
mineral policy.
B. CBMDevelopment in Montana and Wyoming Illustrates the Gold Rush
I76 d. at 542.
37 Hand, supra note 176, at 667.
378 Bryner, supra note 392, at 532; see also Hand, supra note 297, at 667-68.
3 79 Duffy, supra note 11, at 415.
380 Bryner, supra note 392, at 532; see also Catherine Cullicott et al., Coalbed Methane in
the San Juan Basin of Colorado and New Mexico, in COALBED METHANE
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE INTERMOUNTAIN WEST, 51, 68 (Natural Resources Law Center,
University of Colorado School of Law CD-ROM, July 2002).3 8 1Duffy, supra, note 11 at 415.
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The Powder River Basin is most recently the fastest growing CBM
production site in the U.S.382 "In 1996 there were only 193 producing
CBM wells in the Powder River Basin in Montana and Wyoming; current
projections call for as many as 70,000 wells within the next decade."308 3
Since Montana's Oil and Gas Conservation Act was passed in 1953, no
exploratory well proposal has ever been rejected "for environmental
reasons,"38 4 however. The stark contrast between the numbers of wells
drilled and well proposals denied makes it difficult to find confidence in
Montana's state regulatory practices. This problem is compounded by the
amount of surface land encumbered by mineral rights belonging to the
federal government. In Montana "90 percent of the federally owned CBM
reserves are located under private lands."385  In short, private surface
owners cannot escape the energy gold rush.
Split estate relationships are strained in the Powder River Basin.
"Agencies responsible for granting drilling permits have done so with
minimal regulations and have often taken steps to limit public knowledge
of and involvement in the permitting process."386 It has taken legal action
on the part of organizations like the Wyoming Outdoor Council to give
voice to the distress felt by area land owners.
Another level of concern lies with the preemptive power of federal
law to override any state action which tightens regulation of the oil and
gas industry. In 2005, Wyoming passed the Wyoming Surface Owner
Accommodation Act (WSOAA). 8 The Act requires notice to
landowners prior to drilling operations, good faith negotiations, and
surface use agreements which compensate landowners for damage to land,
among other things. 389 These requirements are not echoed in Bureau of
382 Bryner, supra note 396, at 531.
Duffy, supra note 11, at 413.38Id at 420; see also Ray Ring, Backlash: Local Governments Tackle an In-Your-Face
Rush to Coalbed Methane, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Sept. 2, 2002, at 10.385Duffy, supra note 11, at 414 (citing N. PLAINS RESOURCE COUNCIL, YOUR LAND,
YOUR RIGHTS 1 (2003).
3 6Id. at 414-15.
387 See generally J. Benjamin Winburn, Comment, The Coalbed Methane Boom: The
Push for Energy Independence Raises Questions About Water and the Rights of
America's Homesteaders, 19 TUL. ENvTL. L.J. 359 (2006).388 WYo. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-5-401 through 30-5-411 (2005).389 Id. at 384.
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Land Management (BLM) regulation, and may be dismissed at the federal
level. 390 "Industry sources expect the issue to be litigated, yet harbor
doubt as to whether the law will be found to govern BLM activity." 391
Therefore, courts' equitable interventions to improve land owner
protections are often overshadowed by the federal regulatory machine
which prompts apathetic industry behavior.
Under-protection and apathy are the results of explosive contract
behavior on the part of the federal government. Judicial intervention
against contract mismanagement has been piecemeal, and equity
intervention for surface owners, weak. Issues of equity will be explored in
Part VI, which reviews the nature of equitable intervention on the part of
recent courts in the treatment of split estate issues. In this section, the
debate over whether to use standards of conscionability or of fairness in
mineral law issues is addressed.
VI. EQUITABLE INTERVENTION ON THE PART OF THE COURTS
A society that permits conflicts over the use of scarce
resources to be resolved by the threat or the application of
physical force has little need for the concept of property, or
of law. Once, however, a society commits itself to protect
an initial right to use a scarce resource, it must decide upon
the role of private agreement in altering the initial
allocation.392
Property law is the promise of indelible ownership and third party
protections. It is the constant through which broad measures of
reasonableness can be ordered against the rest of the world, often through
acts of equity. Diminished equitable relief is of primary relevance in the
recent demise of property law orientations to mineral law, as equity has
historically been the legal gauge for how best to resolve property issues
holistically.
3 90 Id. at 385; see also 43 C.F.R. §§ 1610.0-10010.62 (2006).
3' Winburn, supra note 409, at 385.
392 Sterk, supra note 29, at 615.
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The evolution of equity in America is a hodgepodge of
asymmetrical legal endeavors which ebb and flow with activist court
regimes. American courts are strapped with the code of the common law,
which dispenses equity with great restraint. Often, balancing common law
and equitable circumstances is difficult for judges who must perform both
functions in concert. Original equity in law did not function in the same
way.
A. A History ofEnglish Equity
In his work on equity in dispute resolution, Thomas 0. Main traces
the history of American jurisprudential equity back to the English
courts. 393 He explains that initially, the king's chancellors, secretaries to
the king, administered "the king's justice"394 on a case by case basis at the
discretion of the king. 395  Chancellors issued writs "commanding the
performance or cessation of certain acts," 396 which became routinized into
issuance of writs according to similar fact patterns. 397  This
standardization process became the basis of common law pleas. 398
Subsequently, common law courts were added to the king's court, where
petitioners would go for hearings after being issued a writ by the
chancery.399
Over time, the common law system hardened into fixed writs and
stringent rules. "Precise and technical rules of pleading, procedure, and
proof, cabined judicial discretion within the form of action."40o "The
ossification of the Common Law made it impossible for many petitioners
to obtain writs appropriate to their peculiar problems." 401 There still
existed "the royal prerogative,"402 however, for chancellors to issue writs








401 Id. at 348.
402 Id. at 348-49
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of subpoena, a summons to appear in Chancery.403  The Court of
Chancery was, therefore, developed from the practice of "ecclesiastical
chancellors" who resolved questions of "ethical rights" through writs
heard by subpoena.
Separate Courts of Equity functioned differently from common law
courts, providing different relief on the grounds of "natural justice." 405
The chancellor unrolled a vast body of legal principle to
which we now refer as Equity to offer relief in those cases
where, because of the technicality of procedure, defective
methods of proof, and other shortcomings in the Common
Law, there was no 'plain, adequate and complete remedy'
otherwise available. In this context, plain was the opposite
of 'doubtful and obscure.' A remedy was not adequate if it
'fell short of what the party was entitled to,' and a remedy
that did not 'attain the full end and justice of the case' was
not complete.406
Against a backdrop of common law rights in American property
law, courts have historically prevailed upon the jurisprudential powers of
equity to decide the role of private agreements in property rights.4 07
Ambiguity became a comfortable issue in property cases primarily because
the tool of equity was available.408 The idiosyncrasies of economics and
industrialization have recently hampered the work of equity in mineral law
cases, however. Courts are now facing hard questions of what role private
agreement will take in managing commingled estates, how to measure
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B. Ending the Debate over Conscionability and Fairness
Resolving how best to measure reasonableness and, thus, gauge
equity with a legal standard is central to defining the nature of mineral
relationships. Mineral law is increasingly plagued by incongruous legal
standards which have inevitably led to inconsistent legal outcomes. As
seen in the phenomenon of CBM case law, property law and its fairness
doctrine combats contract theory and the unconscionability standard for
supremacy in the law of minerals. As will be seen, these standards, by
nature, function exclusively of one another.
In his study on mineral ownership theory, Ronald Polston
differentiates between the property-like development of a relational theory
of the mineral law of leases and the ownership theory of corporeal mineral
estate ownership, which often invokes contract law analysis. 409 Polston
asserts that courts have historically tended to take a relational approach to
oil and gas law rather than a contract approach. 4 10 "The emphasis tends to
be upon what is fair rather than on what the parties own or what they
intended."4 11 Polston makes his point using language from the Manges v.
Guerra412 case in which the court states, "While a contract or deed may
create the relationship, the duty . . . arises from the relationship and not
from express or implied terms of the contract or deed." 4 13
In the world of contract law, however, unfairness is not a reason to
invalidate or even reform an agreement. It takes much more. In his study
of the dimensions of contract theory, David Pierce suggests that finding
unfairness is "simply the beginning of the analysis." 414 In contract law, a
showing of unconscionability is ultimate required.415 The same cannot
be said of oil and gas agreements.4 1 Fairness is the applicable
409 Ronald W. Polston, Mineral Ownership Theory: Doctrine in Disarray, 70 N.D. L.
REv. 541 (1994).
40 Id. at 573.
411 Id.
412 673 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. 1984).
413 Id. at 183.
414 Pierce, supra note 289, at 917.
415 d.
416 Id. at 918.
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contractual measure in mineral theory. 4 17 "While doctrinal contract law
might terminate or modify relationships on the basis of unconscionability,
fraud, mistake, etc., the oil and gas cases have no problem doing so simply
on the basis that an unfairness has occurred." 4 18
Pierce illustrates the difference in legal standards between contract
theory and oil and gas law by commenting on relevant cases such as
Gilmore v. Superior Oil Co. 4 19 In Gilmore, payments for a 1/8 royalty
interest were based on the market value of sale "at the mouth of the
well." 420 Parties entered into the lease agreement under terms specified in
writing without stipulating who would bear the compression costs, which
the lessee incurred in transporting the gas from the "mouth of the well" to
an interstate pipeline. 42 1 Finding ambiguity in the language with respect
to deduction expenses, the court "nullified" the "mouth of the well"
language, and lessee was made to bear the compression expenses alone.42 2
In contract law, however, a court would most likely not have
construed silence on the issue of expense deductions as an ambiguity in
this case, and would have interpreted according to the plain meaning of
the document without modification of terms. Gilmore clearly illustrates
the judicial practice of interpreting contract terms against oil and gas
lessees. Decisions like Gilmore illustrate the inclination of courts to
provide extra protection for the inferior bargaining positions of lessors of
oil and gas. Recent CBM courts have perceived that ownership rights in
CBM will provide the same protections. Under the rules of contract,
however, standards of unconscionability will not afford the same results.
C. Questioning Extra Protection
Relational theory distinguishes the fee simple determinable estate
often held by an oil and gas lessee from the fee simple absolute estate held
by a surface owner. Oil and gas lessees often contract to produce for a
417 Polston, supra note 431, at 573.418 Id. at 573.
419 388 P.2d 602 (Kan.1964).
420 Pierce, supra note 292, at 919 (quoting Gilmore v. Superior Oil Co., 388 P.2d 602.,
603 (Kan. 1964).
421 Id. (quoting Gilmore, 388 P.2d at 603).
422 Id. (quoting Gilmore, 388 P.2d at 603).
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term of years, and usually to continue "as long thereafter" as minerals are
produced. Here, surface owners receive statutory protection through
minimum royalty payments, and ambiguities in leasing terms are decided
in favor of the lessor.
Favoritism falls the other way when both surface and mineral
estates are owned separately through severance. In this case, mineral
owners gain the upper hand against the servient surface owner, and the
parade of horribles associated with mineral dominance often dictates
surface rights. Recent courts using ownership theory to decide issues
between owner estates have approached issues perceiving functional
equanimity between owners, and therefore resort to contract theory for
analysis. Under the ownership approach, "there is little room for the
courts to make adjustments to the relationship based upon fairness and
considerations of policy." 4 23 Results, therefore, are often equity free even
if unintentionally.
A third, and more problematic phenomenon exists, however. The
U.S. government is the largest owner of mineral interests in the country,
and leasing government interests across vast landscapes. Private
landowners are hardly equipped with equal bargaining power against the
colossal machine that is the Bureau of Land Management. In a
relationship where mineral owners literally have the right to "take" private
land, surface landowners are hardly co-equal. In cases of this kind, there
exists what I refer to as a "triadic ownership" relationship between surface
owner, governmental mineral owner and its agent lessee. The mineral
estate represented by the sovereign owner and its mineral agent is far from
perpetual, yet, the mineral estate is defacto interminable during the life of
the mineral by virtue of the preeminence of government presence.
Suggested here is the potential for defining a new kind of
government taking, "taking by agency," against which landowners are
powerless to redress surface harm and destruction against public lands
leasing agreements. Saving that argument for another time, sufficed to say
here that when courts decide claims concerning triadic issues involving
government agent-lessees, their use of the "contract approach" results in a
presumption of mutuality of contract where, in reality, there is none. The
Courts of Montana, Wyoming and Virginia have applied the "contract
183
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approach" in questions of CBM ownership and, in the case of Montana,
claims of unlawful taking were made.
In Carbon County, Union Reserve Coal claimed that a legislative
amendment to the Montana Code "constituted an unlawful taking of coal
seam methane gas from the owners of coal."424 As described, the
Montana Code changed its definition of coal and gas in legislative
amendments during the time the Supreme Court prepared to hear the
Carbon County appeal.425  The Montana Supreme Court held that
"amendments to Title 82 .... do not take away any rights a coal owner
may have to coal seam methane gas .... [which]the coal estate did not have
a right to .. .under the plain language of the grant." 426 Because Montana
held there was a severance of the gas estate from the coal estate, it
determined that "the question of taking without compensation is
necessarily moot."4 27 Results like these create the illusion of equity in
contract when, in reality, there is none.
Extending equity issues further, Part VII explains why there exists
the equity illusion of just intervention in CBM ownership cases. The
illusion is defined by unique oddities in the way oil and gas law manages
equity issues and is supported through public policy goals focused on
expanding fuel production.
VII. EQUITY ILLUSION; WHY EQUITABLE INTERVENTION BY CONTRACT IS
PROBLEMATIC
The issues surrounding resolving equitable land use in split estate
circumstances is aptly stated by the Wyoming Supreme Court in Newman:
"While we recognize that separate ownership of coal and coalbed methane
may result in conflicts, we agree with the United States Supreme Court
when it noted 'that is not the issue before us."' 42 8 Arguably, however,
severable ownership is precisely the issue confounding split estate regimes
across the nation. The future of equity arguments for severed estate
424 Carbon County v. Union Reserve Coal Co., 898 P.2d 680, 689 (Mont. 1995).
425 See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
426 Union Reserve Coal Co., 898 P.2d at 690.427 Id. at 690.
4 28 Newman v. RAG Wyo. Land Co., 53 P.3d 540, 550 (2002).
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owners lies in courts' willingness to determine extraction rights and duties
required of conglomerated estate holders. Unfortunately, problems
abound in that effort given the legal circumvention of activist courts, each
in search of their own equitable solutions to the mineral law chaos. Equity
has become illusive due to a number of shifting ideologies and circular
arguments, jurisprudential preference for contract theory notwithstanding.
A. Oil and Gas Law's Circular Argument Defies Predictability
Courts' reverence for contract interpretation has created a maze for
any plaintiff or defendant needing to understand which way a case will
turn on any given mineral action. Much of the reason lies in the fact that
mineral law, and particularly the law of oil and gas, has recently
marshaled a circular argument which vacillates 429 between theories of
contract and mining law. Some scholars label the circumvention of
contract theory in oil and gas law the nature of "equitable intervention."430
"Courts faithful to contract law enforce the lease contract as written;
courts seeking to mitigate the express terms of the lease contract resort to
implied covenants and other interpretive devices to avoid giving effect to
the contract the parties made." 431 In other words, mineral decisions have
come to vary depending on "why and how [the] courts react to situations
they believe require their equitable intervention." 432  Hence, equitable
intervention becomes a circular argument largely dependent on the
philosophical persuasion of the judge or justices and not necessarily on the
nature of the claim or relevant legal precedent.
As analyzed, CBM ownership cases are prime examples of the
circularity involved in judicial interpretation of mineral law. Courts have
vied to tie CBM ownership to competing legal theories, either in rem or
alternatively in personam. In so doing, the scope of these dueling
arguments remain the same; only the courts change. As a result, legal
interpretation becomes juxtaposing, which results in narrow decisions
made by judicial ideologues. The scenario is troublesome when growing
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numbers of producers, communities and landowners need a holistic,
universal and practical law to invoke for ever complexifying extraction
issues.
B. "Public Policy " Still Means Production Policy
The history of mineral dominance and mining culture has codified
modem mineral law to the virtual exclusion of grazing, agriculture,
conservation and urbanization. To that end, practical public
environmental policy still means mineral production policy.
The eastern mining experience is virtually as old as the first
European settlements in the mountain basins themselves. While the plight
of land owners in the east appears less palpable than in the west, the
destructive nature of broad form deeds has created virtually unlimited
exploitation of the land from the deepest coal seam to the highest
mountaintop. Mountaintop removal is a prime example of how destructive
liberally construed mining rights can be. In the east, mineral production
has decimated surface lands with little recourse or redress for more than a
century. The same can be said of air and water quality.
One example of the continued disregard for the health and safety
of Appalachian communities is offered in J. M Mullins et al. v. Beatrice
Pocahontas Company (1970).433 In this case, "property owners
contend[ed] that the discharge of the [coal] dust constitutes a nuisance so
severe that it blackens lawns and trees, destroys crops, ruins the paint on
buildings and corrodes cars and trucks."434 In a broad form deed dating
back to 1905, predecessors in interest were adjudged to have conveyed
their right to clean air as a reasonable burden on their surface lands.
Equity in this case was a matter of upholding reasonable accommodation
through alternative emissions practices. However, the Fourth Circuit
decided against equity by deciding against breathable air.
C. Complexity May Defy Equity
43 432 F. 2d 314 ( 4 th Cir. 1970).
434 Ic. at 315; see also Banks, supra note 121, at 171-72.
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Courts are often burdened with the weight of the letter of the law.
In reality, the practice of equity is an inevitable departure from bright line
rules, from which precedent rarely follows.4 35 The complexity involved in
balancing common law with equity bespeaks the need for consistency and
predictability in deciding law.43 6  For this reason, consistency and
predictability in mineral law and the law of oil and gas lie by necessity in
the rules of property.437 Therefore, real property rules must garner the
balance of equity in order for justice to serve the personal and industrial
needs of split estate communities. This is critical if for no other reason
that that "all environmental problems require a property rights
solution." 438
The problem is the competing nature of statutory and common law
decisions439 in property law issues. Courts must follow fact patterns and
precedent based on the arguments put forward, theoretically, in the
interests of justice. Legislatures, on the other hand, are "frequently
captured by special interests."440 It can be argued that the success of such
a highly privatized mineral industry in America is the result of political
and economic endeavors rather than regulatory ones. Bruce Yandle and
Andrew Morris frame the issue as such:
Regulatory property solutions differ in their impact on
future technological change. Some solutions, such as tying
a right to emit to use of a specific technology, effectively
eliminate the incentives necessary to produce the new
technologies necessary for the evolution of private property
solutions. Others, like tradable emissions permits, offer a
path into private property rights solution by creating
incentives for technological innovation.441
435 Main, supra note 415, at 360-6 1.
436 See id.
437 See Polston, supra note 323.
438 Bruce Yandle & Andrew P. Morris, The Technologies ofProperty Rights: Choice
Among Alternative Solutions to tragedies of the Commons, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 123, 124
(2001).
4391 d. at 164.
"
0 Id. at 163-64.
441 Id. at 167.
187
Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv., Vol. 16, No. 1
Desirable solutions to environmental health and safety issues lie in
the productivity of private enterprise in reducing environmental risks and
hazards through technological ingenuity. However, corporate motivation
to create this technology is tied to the freedom to command its use, which
brings special interests into the forefront of regulatory decision-making.
This kind of complexity may defy equitable intervention as a cautious tool
of the courts particularly if mineral law evolves into the law of
corporations via the dynamics of special interest legislation. In this way,
re-contractualization of mineral law is aiding in the defiance of equitable
outcomes.
Surface owners are increasingly disadvantaged by progressively
privatized regulatory schemes as courts and legislatures promote
expansive alternative mineral production. In its current condition,
landowners cannot hope to experience improved protection from the chaos
of modern mineral case law. In the present scenario, surface owners often
experience the illusion of equitable protections through judicially re-
contractualized relationships in mineral law and expansionist legislation,
rather than by real equity in property ownership.
With this in mind, Part VIII focuses on extraction rights in mineral
production as best practice for equitable use of split estate lands. This
section highlights the theory of sustainable development and advocates for
broader application of surface use agreements for improved environmental
protection through accommodation principles of property law.
VIII. BEST PRACTICE IS A Focus ON EXTRACTION RIGHTS
The practical effect of the few landmark court cases like Harrison-
Wyatt is the emergence of a new conglomerated ownership theory in the
mining of coalbed methane gas. Recent cases have created new possessor-
producers in the mineral industry who now experience new liability issues,
are potentially restricted by forced interests, and bear the weight of
multiple owner relationships.
Problematically, this multiple owner orientation is recasting an
industrial aversion to environmental protection and surface land protection
on a magnitude not unlike early industrialized mining operations. The
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multiple owner orientation is reflective of the frantically paced and ever
complexifying nature of mineral development in the United States. It is a
theory in need of realignment for the sake of practical goals in mineral
production and to improve the health and safety of America's mining
communities.
For this reason, framing mineral issues with theories of ownership
is impractical and inequitable. Focus on extraction, on the other hand,
eases the burden of newly defined ownership relationships toward the goal
of mutual gain and environmental protection in mineral production.
Concerted focus on what I call a "multiple owner orientation" to mineral
production is arguably one of the most relevant goals of this century. Two
recently articulated principles, in combination, have the potential to make
that goal a reality: (1) the theory of "sustainable development;" and (2)
standardized use of surface use agreements.
A. Sustainable Development
"Sustainable development" is a term more familiar in international
environmental protection circles than in discussions on the future of
mineral development in America.442 Yet, the term is potentially powerful
as a starting point for building a conservation paradigm for modem
mineral development in this country. "Sustainable development is
development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the
ability of future generations to meet their own needs."443 Keith Bauerle,
attorney with Earthjustice, addresses this idea in relation to oil and gas
development in the western United States." 4 He suggests that "phasing or
staging of development to distribute its impacts over time and geography
provides arguably the best means of ensuring the sustainability of the land
and its resources in perpetuity." 445 This approach was offered by various
advocacy groups in an effort to support the National Environmental Policy
442 Bauerle, supra note 175, at 1091-92.
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Act's phased development guidelines for CBM. 446 Bauerle explains the
practical steps that can be taken for successful stage development:
[B]y spreading the number of CBM wells developed in a
given watershed over time, the amount of wastewater
produced within that watershed at any given time, and its
attendant impacts on the ecosystem, ranches and farms,
could be reduced. Likewise, spreading development out
over a longer period of time could help to prevent an
economic boom and bust cycle and its socio-economic
harms. Both geographic and temporal phasing of
development would thus further sustainable development
goal of 'equitably meeting developmental and
environmental needs of present and future generations.
The theory of sustainable development is one originally meant to
apply to renewable resources, but scholars suggest that "carefully paced
mineral development" 448 over a period of 50 years, for example, could
approach something very similar to a sustainable development state of
mineral production. 449  Sustainable development creates what I call
"environmental equity" between mineral production and private
enjoyment of surface land. Without solutions like sustainable
development, America's landscape cannot sustain the legal turmoil
currently causing virtual production anarchy in the backyards of
communities everywhere.
Improved land management requires improved "relational equity"
as much as it does environmental equity. "Relational equity" is what I
term the relationship value of co-managing split estate land use as multiple
owners and extractors. Surface use agreements can provide that result.




4 9 Id. at 1092-93.
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Concerted effort has been made in the west to call for legislation to
require mineral rights owners to obtain consent from surface owners "prior
to leasing . . . and to provide more adequate notification for surface
owners regarding lease sales and drilling applications." 450 Additionally,
"critics have been pushing the states to mandate standardized surface use
agreements that would give ranchers and other landowners more input into
the location of wells, pipelines, roads, and other aspects of CBM activity
on their land." 45 1 Surface use agreements are land use agreements
negotiated between surface owners and mineral producers outlining the
nature and extent of surface access and damage allowable during mineral
extraction.452 Realistically, mineral producers would stand to lose at least
some degree of mineral dominance by engaging in collaborative efforts
like these. Consequentially, "[t]hus far . . . the Montana state legislature
has defeated virtually all legislation aimed at regulating CBM
development."4 53
Some progress has been made in Wyoming, however. The
Wyoming Surface Owner Accommodation Act (WSOAA) mentioned
earlier, calls for "obtaining a surface use agreement that provides for
compensation to the surface owner for damages to the land and
improvement, or getting the surface owner to provide a waiver or written
consent for entry." 454 The future of Wyoming's broadly protective surface
act is uncertain, though, as is the likelihood that split estate owners will
agree to negotiate forced surface use compacts with any degree of success.
In short, collaborative efforts toward redefining split estate relations on a
broad scale is tenuous at best.
Meaningful change in multiple owner orientations to mineral
production necessitates a new form of justice. Moreover, the evolution of
CBM law into case by case inquiry necessitates a better forum than court
for addressing split estate issues. A process that reduces the adversarial
nature of split estate relationships and provides owners with greater self-
determination is meaningful change for the better. Further, environmental
450 Duffy, supra note 11, at 428.
451 id.
452 Id at 419.
453 Id at 429.
454 Winburn, supra note 409, at 384.
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and relational equity are best improved through collaborative problem
solving frameworks, which create co-management orientations to split
estate issues. Therefore, Part IX advocates the use of alternative dispute
resolution processes to mitigate the chaos of CBM extraction issues as
potentially the best solution. Opportunities to negotiate out of court
settlements, to promote private initiatives, and to develop collaborative
approaches to managing split estate relationships are critical practices
offered by a dispute resolution framework.
IX. DISPUTE MANAGEMENT CAN MITIGATE THE CHAOS
The reality for split estate relationships is that they cannot be
legislated 45 5 or adjudicated. They must be mended. Virginia's grant of
CBM ownership to fee surface owners effectively granted dominion
without control and liability without consent. No better scenario exists to
illustrate the need for systemic dispute resolution mechanisms in the
Appalachian Basin and beyond than the new possessor-producer
relationships springing from Harrison- Wyatt.
A. Mediation by Necessity
The search for alternative fuels is happening in our back yards. As
a result, issues and impasse are occurring on a broad scale between split
estate holders with little probability that either the courts or legislatures
will intercede in any timely way. Therefore, private resolution of land use
issues is necessary for parties who want to improve their health and safety
and the quality of the use and enjoyment of their lands. In the new
environment of possessor-producer relationships, informal resolution of
split estate issues has become a necessity. The flexible nature of dispute
resolution allows parties to choose their negotiation process in a timely
fashion with maximized self-determination.
1. Negotiated Settlements
45 Drake D. Hill & P. Jaye Ripply, The Split Estate: Communications and Education
Versus Legislation, 4 WYo. L. REv. 585, 586 (2004).
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Negotiated settlements have proven to be effective tools for
resolution of even the hardest environmental issues. The use of negotiated
settlements under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) is a mainstay for voluntary
cleanup of environmental waste sites. 456 Reportedly, "ADR [(alternative
dispute resolution)] techniques have been critical for the EPA in settling
conflicts involving environmental liability"457 under CERCLA. The
process is such that "potentially responsible parties" (PRPs) are
encouraged to "admit responsibility, and voluntarily enter into
negotiations culminating in a consent decree with the EPA."458 The
language of CERCLA threatens litigation and strict liability remedies for
violators of EPA standards. Therefore, PRPs are generally drawn to
negotiated settlements with the EPA.
"The EPA finds that the use of ADR techniques leads to quicker
and more efficient cleanups of contaminated sites because of the increased
cooperation of PRPs in participating with the cleanup of hazardous waste
sites."459 Moreover, the EPA's use of ADR "greatly decreases the
potentially large transaction costs of environmental litigation." 460 The
primary method used by the EPA is mediation.4 61 "In mediating a dispute
under CERCLA, a neutral third party mediator promotes a 'voluntary
negotiated settlement' between the EPA and a PRP or between two
,,462
opposing PRPs. The result is "more efficient and beneficial
resolutions for improving the public health and welfare." 463
Negotiated settlements under CERCLA are one example of the
effectiveness of alternative dispute resolution practices in highly sensitive
environmental issues. The primary rationale for dispute resolution under
456 David M. Shelton, Cooper Industries v. Aviall Services: Destroying the Incentive for
Negotiated Settlements and Undermining the Increased Use ofAlternative Dispute
Resolution Under the Comprehensive Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 22
OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 839, 844 (2007).
47 Id. at 839-40.
458 Id. at 844.
459 Id. at 847.
0 Id. at 848.
461 Id. at 847.
462 Id. at 847-48.
463 Id. at 843.
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CERCLA is the potential for severe liability for parties in violation of
EPA standards. Dispute resolution enables parties to avoid litigated
liability through voluntary recovery plans. Realistically, however, the
burden of severe liability for surface damage to private landowners in the
ordinary course of mineral production is much lower. There would,
therefore, have to be other compelling reasons for landowners and mineral
producers to agree to privately negotiate surface land use issues. The EPA
illustrates that mediation can be an effective tool against commercial
violators. The question remains, how to bring parties to the table under
less than dire circumstances.
2. Promoting Private Initiatives
In fact, mediation is at work aiding individual landowners in
negotiations to improve surface use by severed mineral producers. In an
article promoting communication efforts for improving mineral
development, Drake Hill and P. Jaye Rippley describe private efforts of
various agencies and advocates to prevent conflict and maximize
cooperation with the oil industry of Wyoming.464 The Wyoming Split
Estate Initiative (WYSEI) is a coalition of organizations with the objective
to "provide resources and tools that their constituents can utilize to help
remove uncertainty as they work through the Surface Use Agreement
process."465 WYSEI has reached out to federal organizations,
conservation programs and the Wyoming Department of Agriculture and
Natural Resource Mediation Program for input and involvement.466 One
of the key goals of the coalition is to "provide a forum for conflict
resolution"467 of issues that arise during negotiating surface use
agreements. Wyoming offers WYSEI services to parties at the inception
of every new lease agreement.
WYSEI hosts a multi-step dispute resolution scheme which begins
by offering disputing parties an "advisory team" to assist parties and make
464 Hill, supra note 191, at 603.
465 Id. at 603 (quoting the Wyoming Split Estate Initiative, What is WYSEI?, available at
http://www.wysei.com/split estate.htm).
466 Id. at 603-04.
6' Id. at 604.
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recommendations on the issues involved.468 If parties are unsuccessful
with the help of an advisory team, then the coalition offers mediation or
arbitration services.469 "Follow-up services"47o are offered "all the way
through the mediation phase." 471 Private initiatives like WYSEI are
potentially more powerful than either judicial or statutory remedy, and
illustrate the meaningful ways private initiatives can invoke positive
change in split estate relations.
B. Mitigating the Equity Illusion
Equitable intervention is increasingly illusive for parties seeking
redress for surface damages in court. The current jurisprudential trend
toward contract theory in mineral law diminishes the fairness doctrine and
disables historical property remedies. There are ways to invoke equitable
remedy, however, through alternative operations. Collaborative
approaches and community action are avenues for improving fairness in
land use in an informed and empowered manner.
1. Collaborative Approaches to Split Estate Relationships
Collaboration is the combined effort of mutual stakeholders in
definin and addressing issues which affect parties to a decision or
action.7 "Collaboration seeks to avoid conflict, litigation, and problems
that have plagued other planning processes and provide a forum for
officials from different levels of government and overlapping jurisdictions
to work together."473 Arriving at sound decisions often requires a number
of self-actualizing activities such as information gathering, joint fact
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Collaborative or consensus-based decision making suggests
that decision makers recognize the importance of place
based decision making and a land ethic and will work to
ensure the participation of all affected interests.
Collaborative efforts must also integrate overlapping
government jurisdictions, develop partnerships for
designing and implementing solutions, learn from
experience, engage in intellectual trial-and-error, and
employ adaptive management techniques and
approaches.475
Contracts and leasing agreements are often exclusively
negotiations rather than collaborations.476 Under today's umbrella of
energy regulation, standards for royalty payments and production costs are
easily assessed.477 More difficult, however, is the balancing of
environmental needs each stakeholder has in using her property most
productively and in harmony.478 "Harmonizing surface and mineral
owner rights is an essential element of reducing the conflicts surrounding
CBM development."4 79 Collaboration can impact contract negotiations
with a great deal of success, if sufficient strides in preventive planning and
collaboration are made.480 There is such a model in place with
collaborative goals at its core: the Model Surface Use and Mineral
Development Accommodation Act.
2. Reviving Key Goals of the Model Act
The Model Surface Use and Mineral Development
Accommodation Act (The Model Act) of 1990 is a broad effort at
improving the welfare of landowners and increasing environmental
protection. When drafting the Model Act, the intent of the National
475 d4 76 Id. at 551-553.
477 Id. at 555.478 Id. at 554.
479 Id. at 554.480 Id. at 560.
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Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws was to create a law
that states could use to "resolv[e] severance disputes equitably and
predictably." 48 1 The Model Act has received mixed reviews. A section of
the act puts forth three worthy goals for improving relations between
surface and mineral owners: "(1) quantify surface and mineral rights and
obligations, (2) encourage accommodation, and (3) provide efficient
severance dispute resolution procedures."4 82 Apart from a solid start, the
Model Act leaves much "to be decided under common law contract and
property principles." 483 Problems notwithstanding, the Model Act is a
starting point for improved efforts toward defining the rights and
responsibilities of possessor-producer estates, encouraging comprehensive
accommodation, and using dispute resolution mechanisms at the state
level.484 Apart from state level intervention, alternative methods of
dispute resolution most often find the greatest sustainability in community
level support and practice.485
3. Practicing Community Involvement and Action
In his research on the emergence of collaboration in the energy
field, Ric Richardson traces the beginning of public involvement in energy
issues to the 1977 Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act
(SMCRA). 486 "The Act established a framework for public participation
in mining and mine reclamation issues."4 87  SMCRA's initial findings
"concluded that interagency and public cooperation was necessary to
prevent or mitigate adverse environmental impacts of surface mining." 4 88
Public involvement assures improved understanding of the issues which
affect split estate relations, and increases negotiating leverage as more
persons become involved with community issues. The positive effects of
481 Wenzel, supra note 179, at 613.
482 Id. at 650.
4Id. at 661.
484Id. at 648-50.
485 Main, supra note 415, at 372.
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community involvement in dispute resolution processes are particularly
powerful.
ADR empowers neighborhoods to resolve disputes that are
not cognizable in or are otherwise ignored by formal
dispute resolution systems. . . incorporate[ing] local values
and norms into the decision-making calculus. .. tend ing]
to emphasize compromise, reconciliation, and fairness.
Community involvement in alternative dispute management greatly
enhances the potential for social and civic reform. In this way, community
involvement "illustrates the progressive role that equity can play in the
moral growth of the law." 490
C. Putting Conciliation Language to Work
Both the 1990 Virginia Gas and Oil Act (VA ACT) and the
National Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPACT) include provisions "to aid
in the resolution of competing ownership claims," 4  such as forced
pooling orders and escrow accounts where "conflicting interests" exist.492
The VA ACT has been replicated by other states, and even EPACT
adopted language from the VA ACT.493  Problematically, EPACT's
conciliatory language is mooted by forced or standardized solutions to
competing mineral interests. As a result, forced pooling and mandated
royalty payments are currently most states' best efforts at managing split
estate disputes.
In the article, The State of the States in Environmental Dispute
Resolution,494 Rosemary O'Leary, Tracy Yandle, and Tamilyn Mooreb
take a state. by state look at the effectiveness of each state's environmental
dispute resolution programs. In Virginia, for example, the Virginia Code
489 Main, supra note 415, at 372.
4 0 Id. at 376.
491 McClanahan, supra note 6, 48 OKLA. L. REv. 471, 519 (1995).492 Id. at 524.
493 Id. at 482.
494 See generally Rosemary O'Leary et al., The State of the States in Environmental
Dispute Resolution, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 515 (1999).
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authorizes the use of environmental mediation "under certain
circumstances."495 As a result, Virginia offers ad hoc environmental
mediation services through university-based and private mediation
496services in the state. Virginia could do more, as could most states, in
managing mineral production issues.
Unfortunately, even after forced pooling occurs, and royalties are
paid, parties must still ultimately resolve land use issues arising out of
extraction activity. Problematically, legal regimes have too quickly
formulated fixed solutions to relational problems in mineral issues without
employing a functional way to address case by case analysis. Until law
makers understand the relational dynamics existing between split estate
owners, alternative resolution resources will not be tapped. Until that
happens, functional resolution of mineral production and environmental
resource protection issues will continue to elude courts and legislatures
alike, to the exhaustion of court dockets everywhere and to the demise of
countless communities across America.
CONCLUSION
There is nothing plain in the language of Virginia's ruling on the
plain language of intent of predecessors in interest, dead 100 years before
coalbed methane gas became a valuable fuel resource. The real truth of
the matter is that no jurisprudential tool exists for deciding the ownership
of coalbed methane gas in the vacuum of time and place, except the tool of
equity. Potentially, the decision in Harrison-Wyatt could have been the
result of a court's granting of equity to surface estate owners, bearing on
the history of marked inequity in mineral production of the Appalachian
Basin.
Virginia, however, used the wrong jurisprudential tools in its
effort. The Court diminished property law in favor of a new contract
approach to mineral conveyancing which argues ownership instead of
extraction. Further, it ballooned the difficult work of managing mineral
issues by perpetuating a case by case analysis with diminished evidentiary
495 VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1186.3 (1998).
496 O'Leary, supra note 523, at 601.
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tools available under the contract approach. Finally, the Court invoked a
higher burden of proof for equitable relief by utilizing contract theory
instead of relational equity in fairness. Equity, therefore, is less of what
the state Supreme Court achieved than chaos.
Essentially, in re-contractualizing Virginia's mineral law, the
Virginia Supreme Court has prompted the deterioration of equity in
mineral law. The question becomes therefore, "How can the practice of
equity survive Virginia's new common law approach to mineral
ownership?" The answer is that it most likely cannot. A systemic tool
with greater reach is needed. That tool is alternative means of dispute
resolution. The alternative to judicial equity lies in the collaborative
efforts of dispute resolution, particularly as alternative fuel production
expands to new reaches, and into new communities of surface owners.
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